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Summary
We and other researchers have examined the investment-related risks to public pension funds,
to the governments that contribute to them, and to stakeholders in pension funds and
governments, using stochastic simulation models of pension fund finances. These models
simulate many potential future paths of pension fund finances, with each path having different
investment returns drawn from an assumed distribution of investment returns. We analyze
risks to governments by examining required contributions relative to projected government
revenue.
These models generally use simple investment return assumptions. For example, our models
have assumed that investment returns have an expected compound annual return of 7.5
percent and a standard deviation of 12 percent, are drawn from a normal distribution, and are
independent from year to year. Our analysis of fiscal risks to governments has assumed that
investment returns and governmental tax revenue are uncorrelated.
Research, however, suggests that the real world differs from these assumptions, in some ways
that mean the assumptions may understate risks, and in other ways that mean the assumptions
may overstate risks. Investment returns may not be normally distributed and may not be
independent over time. Perhaps more important, investment returns and tax revenue may be
correlated: a poor economy may dampen investment returns and cause tax revenue to fall
short. Reduced investment returns typically require governments to increase their annual
contributions to pension funds to make up the shortfalls, but those increases in contributions
may compound fiscal pressures on governments if the increases come when tax revenues are
low.

Linking an economic scenario generator to a pension simulation model and tax revenue
models
We address these issues, focusing on the correlation between tax revenue and the economy, by
building a small macroeconomic model, sometimes called an economic scenario generator
(ESG), that generates internally consistent stochastic scenarios of growth in real gross domestic
product (GDP) and returns from stock and bond investments.
We use outputs from the economic scenario generator to simulate anticipated tax revenue of
stylized governments, based upon historical relationships between business cycles and tax
revenue for different tax types, some of which are quite volatile, and others of which are more
stable. We construct two stylized governments. The first is an income-tax-dominant
government that has highly cyclical tax revenue that is even more cyclical in recessions in which
financial markets fall. The second is a sales-tax-dominant government with tax revenue that is
similar in cyclicality to the economy but less cyclical than the income-tax-dominant state. We
compare these stylized governments to a baseline government in which tax revenue grows at a
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constant rate, with no cyclicality, and to a government in which tax revenue grows at the same
rate as GDP and therefore has the same cyclicality as GDP.
We use investment-return outputs of the economic scenario generator to drive a stochastic
simulation model of pension fund finances that tracks pension fund financial status and
calculates required employer contributions.
Because the economic scenario generator drives tax revenue while also driving pension fund
finances, simulated tax revenue will be correlated with investment returns in ways consistent
with past relationships, a conceptual improvement over simpler models. We use these results
to calculate fiscal pressure and risks to stylized governments and compare these risks to those
resulting from simpler assumptions in which tax revenue is not cyclical.

Examining compounding risks
We examine the potential compounding of risks with the simulated tax revenue of stylized
governments and simulated pension finances, with both simulations linked to the
macroeconomic simulation. Economic growth and asset returns are jointly simulated by a
process that switches between recession and expansion regimes and captures the historical
pattern of the business cycle. The tax revenues of stylized governments are then calculated
based on the simulated economic conditions and asset returns.
The asset returns are fed in to our pension simulation model to calculate the required employer
contributions, among other variables of interest. The model is based on a plan with average
demographics that assumes an average annual investment return of 7.5 percent. The plan is 75
percent funded in year 1, approximating the funded status of many current plans. The
government is assumed to pay full actuarially determined contributions requested by the plan
each year, no matter how high.
We examine results under three pension funding policies:
1. 10-year open constant dollar: Unfunded liabilities are paid down rapidly, with constantdollar amortization payments calculated over a 10-year open period. The employer’s
contribution in year 1 is 8.67 percent of tax revenue.
2. 15-year open constant dollar: Unfunded liabilities are paid down less rapidly, over a 15year open period. The employer’s contribution in year 1 is 7.25 percent of tax revenue.
3. 30-year open constant percent of payroll: Unfunded liabilities are paid down very
slowly, as a constant percentage of payroll over a 30-year open period. (Several large
plans with large unfunded liabilities use this method.) The employer’s contribution in
year 1 is 5 percent of tax revenue.
Tax revenues of the income-tax-dominant government and sales-tax-dominant government
grow at the simulated growth rate. We also created a benchmark government for which the tax
revenue grows at a constant rate equal to the assumed long-term trend growth rate of GDP
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(1.9 percent). Employer contributions as a percentage of total tax revenue in each simulation
are then calculated for all types of government and policy scenarios.
We examine two types of risks that the sponsoring governments of public pension plans may
face:
1. The risk that required employer contributions become very high relative to fiscal
resources available to the sponsoring government, creating great fiscal pressure and
potentially crowding out other public services. In our analysis of the simulation results,
we measure this type of risk by the probability that employer contributions as a
percentage of total tax revenue will become more than 5 percentage points higher than
the level in year 1 at any time during the 30-year simulation period.
2. The risk that required employer contributions rise sharply in a short period of time,
creating difficulty in budget planning and short-term fiscal pressure. We measure this
type of risk by the probability that employer contributions rise more than 3 percent of
total tax revenue in a 2-year period at any time during the 30-year simulation period.

Summary of results
The risk of high employer contributions
Table 1 shows the risk of employer contribution as a percentage of total tax revenue rising by 5
percentage points or more relative to the starting point during the 30-year simulation period
under our different models and funding policies. The three rows of the table show our three
funding policies and the six columns show the size of the risk under our six models.
The first column presents the risk measure when tax revenue grows smoothly over time
without any business cycle effects, and investment returns are normally distributed and
independent over time, without any correlation to the economy. It is akin to the kinds of
simulations we have done in past papers, and the risk measures are lower than those for all of
the models to the right. For example, there is a 6.8 percent chance that employer contributions
will rise by more than 5 percentage points of tax revenue above their year 1 levels at some
point during the 30-year simulation period – a smaller risk than in any column to the right.
The second column also assumes that tax revenue grows smoothly, but now investment returns
are generated by the regime-switching simulation model; returns are correlated with economic
conditions and have a heavier left tail in the return distribution than in the normal distribution,
meaning that very low returns are more common than in the normal distribution. Thus,
comparing this column to column 1 shows us the pure effect of linking investment returns to
the economy, without considering tax revenue cyclicality, shedding light on the impact of
introducing non-normality in investment returns. The risks of high employer contributions are
only slightly higher than in the base case.
Column 3 now allows tax revenue to be exactly as cyclical as real GDP. For example, if real GDP
grows 2 percentage points more quickly than its trend, tax revenue will grow at the same rate.
5

Investment returns are drawn from the normal distribution rather than being generated by our
ESG. Thus, comparing column 3 to column 1 shows us the pure effect of introducing volatility in
tax revenue that is not correlated with investment returns, without accounting for differences
in tax structure. The risks are slightly greater than in the base case and not much different from
those in column 2.
Column 4 allows tax revenue to be exactly as cyclical as real GDP and includes investment
returns generated by the economic scenario generator, and therefore both investment returns
and tax revenue are linked to the economy. Comparing this column to column 2 and column 3
shows the risk introduced by having correlated investment returns and tax revenue., The
comparisons show that the increase in risk is quite large. For example, under a 10-year open
constant-dollar funding policy, the risk of a contribution increase of at least 5 percentage points
of tax revenue is 17.8 percent, or more than a one in six chance of such an increase during the
30-year simulation period. Comparing column 4 to column 1 demonstrates that while the
isolated effects of linking tax revenue or investment returns to the business cycle are modest,
the compounding effect of correlated tax revenue and investment returns is large. For example,
under the 15-year open constant dollar funding policy, the risk of high pension contribution is
2.7 times as great as in column 1 (17.2 percent compared to 6.4 percent), while for columns 2
and 3 the measures are only 1.4 and 1.5 times as great.
Columns 5 and 6 introduce our two stylized governments, with tax revenue cycles depending
not just on real GDP cycles but also on tax structure. In both models, investment returns are
generated by the economic scenario generator. The risks for the sales-tax-dominant
government actually are slightly smaller than if revenue is exactly as cyclical as real GDP. 1 The
risks for the income-tax-dominant state are much larger: the risk of a large employer
contribution is 22.8 percent, compared to 16.5 percent for the sales-tax-dominant state, and
compared to 6.8 percent for the base case where neither investment returns nor tax revenue
are linked to the economy.
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Table 1 Risk of high pension contribution relative to tax revenue

Comparing risks as we move down the rows of Table 1 also is instructive, as it shows the
interplay between funding policy and contribution risk. Risks of large employer contributions
fall somewhat as the funding policy lengthens, particularly as we move from 15 years to 30
years and change from constant-dollar funding to constant-percentage-of-pay funding. Because
this risk measure compares every year in a 30-year simulation to the starting year, it is a
measure of longer-term risks, and funding policies that smooth contributions have only limited
ability to reduce this risk. They have much greater ability to reduce the risk of large employer
contributions in a short period of time, as discussed below.
The risk of large contribution increases in a short period of time
Table 2 presents our short-term risk measure – the probability that employer contributions will
rise by more than three percent of tax revenue in any two-year period during our 30-year
simulation - for the same models and funding policies. The format and interpretation are the
same as for Table 1.
As with our other risk measure, the risk increases as we move to the right in the table, but not
as much as with our longer-term risk measure, the risk of a large contribution increase over the
30-year period. Furthermore, risks of sharp employer contribution increases diminish
dramatically as we move down the rows of the table, lengthening the contribution smoothing
period and liberalizing the policy by using constant-percentage-of-pay funding.
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Table 2 Risk of sharp increases in pension contributions relative to tax revenue

Contribution-smoothing policies cannot make risks go away: They transfer risks from
governments to pension plans
Lower risks for sponsoring governments under funding policies with stronger contributionsmoothing effects come at the expense of higher risk that the pension plan will become
severely underfunded, as Table 3 demonstrates.
The first column of Table 3 ties to the fourth column of Table 2 to provide a useful point of
reference, showing how the risk of sharp increases in employer contributions declines as the
funding period lengthens and the policy liberalizes. The last column shows the risk that the
plan’s funded ratio will fall below 40 percent, which we consider to be crisis territory, at some
point during the 30-year simulation period. (We explain the intervening columns after the
table.) As we move down the rows, the risk of this crisis-level funding rises from 7.1 percent
with a 10-year constant-dollar funding policy to 30.9 percent, or nearly a one in three chance,
with 30-year constant percent of payroll funding. (This latter risk is far greater than risks we
estimated in earlier papers, when investment returns were not linked to economic conditions.
This shows the importance of the linkage we do in this paper.) The risk protection that
governments gain from stretched-out funding policies results in greater risk to pension plans.

8

Table 3 Greater contribution smoothing leads to higher risk of pension underfunding

Conclusions and lessons
In this paper we examine how our assessment of risks to pension funds and their sponsoring
governments changes when we take into consideration the correlation between economic
conditions, investment returns, and governmental tax revenue. We do this by linking an
economic scenario generator - a small stochastic macroeconomic model that simulates real
GDP growth and investment returns – to models of tax revenue cyclicality and a pension
finance simulation model. Our paper builds upon other recent research that has examined risks
to pension funds and governments under alternative economic scenarios.
The simulation results demonstrate that it is important to allow for correlation among
economic conditions, investment returns, and tax revenue when examining the investmentrelated risks to public pension funds and the sponsoring governments. Contribution increases
required after economic downturns are much larger, relative to tax revenue, when we allow tax
revenue to be cyclical (varying with the economy) than under simpler assumptions of stable tax
revenue growth. Pension-related risks for governments can be further exacerbated by how
state tax revenue structures respond to economic conditions. All else equal, income-taxdominant states, with highly cyclical tax revenue, face higher pension-related risks than salestax-dominant states, which have less-cyclical tax revenues.
The choice of funding policies for public pension funds also has a significant impact on the risks
that sponsoring governments face. Funding policies that pay down unfunded liabilities slowly
and have strong smoothing effects on contribution requirements can protect the sponsoring
governments from the risks of high pension contributions in the near term, or of sharp
increases in contributions, at the expense of greatly increasing the risk of severe underfunding
for the pension funds.
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This paper shows how important it is to incorporate budgetary resources in pension fund risk
analysis, and how that analysis can be deepened by modeling business cycles and investment
returns together. Our work in this area is preliminary and can be extended and improved upon.
What do the insights from this work mean for larger efforts underway to encourage pension
funds and governments to conduct stress testing and to report on risks to plan beneficiaries,
legislators, citizens, and taxpayers? This paper highlights that these risks are larger than
commonly understood, and that such efforts are critically important.
Stress testing and risk reporting are, we hope, the wave of the future. The recent trend has
been in that direction. The Society of Actuaries called for stress testing in its 2014 Blue Ribbon
Panel report. While relatively few plans and states conduct risk reporting as a matter of course,
more have been doing so, with several states now requiring it. The Actuarial Standards Board
recently has encouraged greater reporting on risks with proposed actuarial standards of
practice. More states and plans should follow this lead.
First steps that plans and governments are taking now are important, with simple measures
that plans can readily calculate and the public can easily understand. Comparisons to economic
and revenue resources assuming stable growth are an important part of those steps, as are
stress testing under asset and economic shock scenarios. Integrated stochastic analysis of the
impact of business cycles and the economy, such as we do here, can be adapted to plans and
governments and can further deepen risk reporting and stress testing. It not need not be part
of a first step, but it should not delay first steps. Understanding and assessing risks are
necessary first steps toward managing risks.

Introduction
Public pension underfunding represents the single-largest long-term threat to the finances of
the state and local government sector, although it is a much bigger threat for some
governments than for others. Assessing the risks is difficult because the magnitude and
likelihood of pension underfunding depends upon investment returns, and the resulting
governmental fiscal stress depends upon pension funding needs in relation to governmental
fiscal resources. Investment returns and governmental resources both depend, in part, upon
underlying economic conditions.
In this paper we link an “economic scenario generator” (ESG) that generates stochastic future
paths of gross domestic product, and investment returns for several asset classes, to (1) a
pension fund simulation model, and (2) models of governmental tax revenue. We use these
linked models to analyze how risks to governments and pension plans can be compounded
because investment returns and tax revenue are driven by the same underlying economic
conditions, building upon previous research on pension fund stress-testing.2
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Important issues that pension simulation models do not address
We and others have modeled public pension fund finances stochastically, addressing how
investment returns may affect pension fund finances and the finances of governments that
contribute to plans. When these models link pension fund finances to government finances,
they generally do so in ways that assume that governmental fiscal resources are independent of
investment returns, and that fiscal resources grow smoothly rather than varying cyclically.
These models often generate investment-return scenarios simply, based on the assumption
that portfolio returns are normally distributed and independent over time. (Recent research
has improved upon this by examining shock scenarios in which both governmental revenue and
investment returns are affected. 3) Both sets of assumptions are imperfect.
First, governmental fiscal resources may be correlated with pension fund financial condition,
because tax revenue and investment returns both are related to underlying economic
conditions. For example, some recessions may cause sharp falloffs in governmental tax revenue
and produce investment shortfalls. This was true of both the 2001 and 2007 recessions, and
some earlier recessions.4 Increases in governmental contributions may be required when tax
revenue available to pay contributions is falling (or falling short of expectation), causing more
fiscal stress to governments than simple models suggest. Greater fiscal stress could make
governments more likely to underpay requested contributions, heightening risks to pension
fund finances.
Second, portfolio investment returns may be far more complex than models traditionally
assume: Investment returns may be related to economic conditions rather than independent
over time, they may be distributed non-normally, and correlations among asset classes may
change over time.5 These real-world considerations could make risks to pension funds from
investing in risky assets greater or less than simple models suggest.
An improved understanding of these issues could lead to plan designs and funding policies that
are better suited to the finances of the governments that fund public pensions.

How we address these issues using linked models
To examine these issues, we develop and link a small-scale macro-economic and investmentreturns model to a pension fund simulation model and models of governmental tax revenue.
This allows us to generate stochastic economic, investment-return, and fiscal scenarios in an
integrated fashion. The model allows us to explore how economic scenarios can cause
investment returns and governmental fiscal resources to vary together.
In future work, the model could be used to examine policy options that are best analyzed in a
stochastic framework that integrates economic variables and asset returns. For example, policy
options in which Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) or other contingent benefits depend upon
plan funded status require such a framework. (The size of the COLA may depend upon inflation,
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while plan funded status will depend heavily on asset returns. Because inflation and asset
returns may be correlated, an integrated model is valuable.)
The model we describe in this paper links investment returns to economic conditions. However,
the model currently cannot produce other departures from traditional investment-return
assumptions. For example, we cannot require that investment returns for a particular asset
class follow a specific non-normal distribution. In future work, we plan to supplement the
model with other methods for generating investment returns. We describe our work to date on
this in a companion technical report.

How the models fit together
We have built an integrated economic scenario generator that allows us to construct internally
consistent simulations of real gross domestic product (GDP) and investment returns on several
asset classes, far into the future, following paths over time that reflect parameters estimated
from historical data or obtained from projections of future economic environments. By adding
random errors to model results, we can simulate thousands of such paths.
We use outputs from the economic scenario generator as inputs to:
1. A pension fund simulation model, which yields as outputs information on funded status
of the plan and contribution requirements by governments.
2. Models of governmental tax revenue for income taxes, general sales taxes, selective
sales taxes, and other taxes as a group. The models allow revenue from these taxes to
respond to economic cycles in ways that are consistent with historical patterns. We
combine revenue from these taxes to create two stylized governments: an income-taxdominant government and a sales-tax-dominant government. The economic scenarios
affect the revenue resources of the stylized governments in different ways. For example,
some economic scenarios will cause sharper revenue cycles in the income-tax-dominant
government than in the sales-tax-dominant government.
We combine employer contribution requirements from the pension fund simulations and tax
revenue of the stylized governments to analyze the stress that pension contributions may place
upon the finances of governments. This considers the relationships among economic
conditions, investment returns, pension fund finances, and governmental finances in a way that
has not, to our knowledge, been done by other researchers.
Figure 1 summarizes how the models work together.
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Figure 1 Model structure and linkage
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The economic scenario generator
We have constructed an economic scenario generator with three equations resulting in three
outputs: growth in real GDP, total stock market returns, and total returns on long-term bonds.
The model’s equations are estimated from quarterly data, and they produce quarterly outputs
that we convert to annual values. (See the companion technical report for details.)
The equation for real GDP growth allows the economy to cycle between two regimes, economic
expansion and recession. The model estimates average GDP growth in each regime (faster
average growth in expansion than recession), and the probabilities of switching from expansion
to recession, or recession to expansion, from one quarter to the next. This approach is known
as a Markov-switching model and is based upon a seminal paper by James Hamilton.6 The
specific equation we use models GDP growth as a random walk with drift, which does a good
job of capturing the general historical pattern of expansions and recessions, as we discuss in the
companion technical report. Because we are particularly interested in cyclical economic and tax
revenue patterns, we chose this specification.
Stock returns are generally considered to be a random walk process with drift. Our equation for
total stock market returns allows for two regimes - high-return-low-volatility periods, and lowreturn-high-volatility periods, based upon our examination of historical data. We implement
this by modeling total stock returns as a random walk with a drift, where the drift term and the
variance depend upon the Markov-switching regime.
The economic scenario generator allows for correlation between stock returns and GDP growth
by aligning their regimes. We estimated separate regime-switching models for GDP growth and
stock returns and found that the recession regimes of GDP growth are generally aligned with
the low-return-high-volatility regimes of stock returns, especially in periods of severe economic
downturn. Thus, when using the model to produce simulations, we ensure that the expansion
regimes of GDP coincide with the high-return-low-volatility regimes of stock returns, and the
recession regimes of GDP growth coincide with as the low-return-high-volatility regimes of
stock return.
We have not modeled bond returns econometrically, because of their weak historical
relationships to business cycles. Instead, when we produce economic scenarios, we construct
stochastic bond returns that have correlations to stock returns that are consistent with
historical correlations.
Examining the performance of our economic scenario generator
To analyze how well these equations mimic historical patterns of expansion and recession, and
of stock and bond returns, we conducted 2,000 simulations of the quarterly equations over 63
years (the length of time over which we estimated the equations). The model requires several
parameters including the average growth rate in expansions, average decline in recessions,
probability of switching from expansion to recession from one quarter to the next, or vice
versa, expected bond returns and standard deviation, and correlation between stock and bond
14

returns. For this evaluation purpose, we used parameters estimated from historical data. We
then examined the extent to which the simulation results are consistent with historical
patterns.
We summarize the results in Table 4, which compares historical values to the median simulation
result, and shows where the historical value fits in the distribution of our simulations. (The
companion technical report examines not just the median of simulation results, but also the
distribution.) The table is organized into four blocks: economic regimes, GDP growth, stock
returns, and bond returns, which we explain immediately after the table7.

15

Table 4 Simulated values using historical parameters are quite consistent with historical data

The economic regimes block summarizes how well the GDP equation reproduces historical
patterns of recession and contraction. It shows that there were 10 recessions over our 63-year
historical period, with an average length of 3.7 quarters. For each of our 2,000 simulations of 63
16

years, we counted the number of recessions and the average duration. The median model run
produced 10 recessions, with an average duration of 3.0 quarters. Similarly, the historical
period had 10 expansions with average length of 20.2 quarters, while the median simulation
had 11 expansions with average length of 19.4 quarters. The last column of the table shows
where the historical value fits in the simulated distribution: for example, the historical number
of expansions, 10, was slightly below the simulated median of 11 recessions, and fell at the 40 th
percentile of our simulations (i.e., below the 50th percentile).
The GDP-growth block shows the mean and standard deviation of GDP growth (quarterly
growth at an annualized rate). The historical growth rate is slightly below our median
simulation; the standard deviation, while only moderately higher than our median simulation, is
at the 91st percentile of simulated values.
The second and third blocks of the table compare historical means and standard deviations for
stock and bond returns to simulated values. They also include a measure of “heavy-tailedness”
– the extent to which stock or bond returns have more extreme values than the normal
distribution would suggest. This measure, called “kurtosis,” is positive when the simulated
distribution is more heavy-tailed than the normal distribution, and negative if it is less so.
Overall, we think that simulations from the model, constructed using parameter values
estimated from history, are quite consistent with historical values. The companion technical
report evaluates the model in greater detail and examines alternative specifications that did
not perform as well.

Modeling cyclical tax variability for individual taxes
We estimate the cyclical relationships between taxes and the economy for state personal
income taxes, the state general sales tax, state selective sales taxes, and all other state
government taxes as a group. We focus on these taxes because they play prominent roles in
states’ tax portfolios. We also examine local government property taxes but do not model
them, as we discuss further below. Table 5 shows the roles these taxes play in state and local
government tax portfolios. (For further information, see the companion technical report.)
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Table 5 Personal income and general sales taxes are the most important state government taxes, and the
property tax is the most important local tax

State and local government tax shares in 2015
State
government

Local
government

Personal income tax

36.9%

4.8%

General sales tax

31.4%

12.5%

Selective sales taxes

15.9%

4.8%

Property tax

1.7%

72.1%

Other

14.1%

5.8%

Total

100.0%

100.0%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2015 Annual Survey of State
and Local Government Finances

Individual taxes can exhibit different long-run behavior relative to the economy – for example,
progressive income taxes generally will grow more quickly than the economy, while state sales
tax bases have been declining relative to the economy.8 In our analyses below, we assume that
politicians will adjust tax bases and rates to maintain their shares of the economy over the long
run, but that there will be cycles around this trend.9 Our job is to construct reasonable
estimates of these cycles, for different taxes, that relate tax revenue cycles to GDP and other
outputs from our economic scenario generator.
To estimate relationships between the cyclical components of tax revenue and the economy,
we use annual national data for 1977-2015 on tax revenue for the major tax types, obtained
from the Urban Institute’s Data Query System (SLF-DQS).10 11 We adjust each series for inflation
using the GDP price index. We then remove the trend from each tax series, from real GDP, and
from nominal stock market returns using a decomposition approach known as the Hodrick–
Prescott filter, which allows the trend to move slowly over time.12 We subtract the trend of
each series from its unadjusted value to obtain the cyclical component.13
The cyclical components of the three largest state government tax revenue sources (personal
income taxes, state sales taxes, and local property taxes) are shown in Figure 2, along with the
cyclical component of real GDP, each as a percentage of its trend. We make several
observations: First, the income tax and sales tax have cycles that occur close in time to GDP
18

cycles, but the cyclical pattern of the property tax, if there is one, is less clear. 14 Second, both
the income tax and the sales tax tend to have greater cyclical swings than GDP, relative to their
trends. Third, the income tax cycles became far larger near the recessions of 2001 and 2007
than they had been near earlier recessions. We explore this further below.
Figure 2 Cycles in revenues of major taxes

The income tax presents interesting issues, because its cyclical behavior is highly dependent not
just upon economic growth, but also upon how recessions and recoveries affect asset values
and thereby capital gains from assets, which are included in most state’s income taxes.15 Figure
3 shows inflation-adjusted total stock market returns as measured by the S&P 500, inflationadjusted capital gains, and inflation-adjusted state income tax revenue. The influence of stock
market returns and values on capital gains is apparent, as is the impact of capital gains on
income tax revenue. This figure shows that it is important to incorporate asset returns into a
model of the cyclical behavior of income tax revenue.
Figure 3 Income tax revenue is influenced heavily by stock-market-driven capital gains
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Based on these and other observations, we model the cyclical growth rate of real tax revenues
as a function of the cyclical growth rate of real GDP and, in the case of the personal income tax,
the cyclical growth rate of real stock market values.16 In this approach, the coefficient of the
percentage change in cyclical tax revenue relative to cyclical GDP growth can be interpreted as
a cyclical elasticity.

Why we did not model the property tax and how we might incorporate it in the future
We do not include the property tax in our models, despite its importance to local governments,
because we do not think its relationship to the economy can be modeled simply. In general, the
property tax is more stable and resilient than other major taxes such as the personal income tax
and the sales tax. This is especially important in recessionary periods. However, this conclusion
also depends greatly on the institutions and rules affecting the property tax.
The economy has direct impacts on income and sales taxes: economic changes cause tax-base
changes (e.g., a recession causes slower growth, or even declines, in wages), and the tax-base
changes cause changes in tax collections (e.g., slower wage growth causes slower income tax
withholding growth), generally with some lags.
Property tax mechanisms are more complicated: Economic changes may or may not lead to
substantial changes in the market values of properties. This has varied from recession to
recession. Often, property-value changes are not large (the 2007 recession was an exception).
Market-value changes may lead to changes in assessed values. How long that will take depends
upon several factors including administrative cycles for assessing property (which may be as
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long as 3 years or 5 years, or even longer), and both general and ad hoc governmental policies
on how quickly changes in market values should be reflected in assessed values. For example,
Proposition 8 in California required rapid adjustments in assessed values in the wake of the
Great Recession.
Assessed value changes may lead to changes in taxable assessed value. However, these changes
may not occur all at once. They may be phased in over several years. They may differ from one
type of property to another, such as when governments place limits on whether or how rapidly
taxable assessed values of homeowner properties may be adjusted. Some may not be adjusted
until properties are sold.17
Finally, many governments calculate their property tax levies and then adjust tax rates to
achieve those levies. But other governments are constrained by tax and expenditure limit
institutions that limit the size of the levy, or growth in the levy, or changes in tax rates, or tax
rates as a percentage of property values. In the Great Recession, California local governments
found themselves constrained by Proposition 13, which limited tax rates as a percentage of
property value, making it hard for most governments to maintain tax levies in the face of
declining property market values and assessed values. But local governments in other states,
such as New Jersey and New York, often were able to raise tax rates to offset the impact of
declining assessed values. Examination of property tax revenue trends for individual local
governments in these states shows very different revenue responses to the Great Recession.
Thus, institutions and rules that vary by state and even by specific local governments can
influence how property tax revenue is affected by economic changes, and how quickly those
changes affect property tax revenue. For these reasons, we have not modeled the property tax
in this paper.
In future analyses, we may be able to incorporate the property tax by constructing several
stylized property-tax-dominant governments that operate in different institutional
environments. For example, one stylized government might have institutions that cause it to
reassess properties slowly and allow it to adjust tax rates to maintain the tax levy, while
another might be required to reassess properties quickly and have limited ability to adjust tax
rates.

Combining trend and cyclical growth
In our simulation model, we obtain growth for a revenue source by adding its trend growth to
its cyclical growth, where the cyclical component will depend upon GDP growth from our
economic scenario generator and, in the case of the income tax, upon stock market returns. As
noted earlier, we assume – lacking any basis for a better assumption - that politicians will adjust
tax revenue periodically to keep trend revenue a constant share of the economy, meaning that
trend revenue will grow at the same rate as trend GDP. This is consistent with the
Congressional Budget Office’s assumption that average growth in potential GDP over the next
30 years is likely to approximate 1.9 percent annually, reflecting anticipated labor force growth,
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labor force participation, and productivity. Thus, we assume trend tax growth is 1.9 percent for
each tax source.
Table 6 shows the trend growth rate for each tax and our assumptions, based upon econometric

estimates using data from 1953 to 2015, of cyclical revenue elasticities. The first row shows the
trend growth rate. The second row shows the cyclical elasticity for the revenue source, relative
to GDP growth. For example, the sales tax cyclical elasticity is 1.2. Thus, if GDP has a cyclical
decline (relative to its trend) of 3 percent, the sales tax will have a cyclical decline of 3.6 percent
relative to its trend. The income tax is more complicated because it also reflects a cyclical
relationship to stock market returns.
Table 6 Tax revenue elasticities

An example may help to explain how we apply these parameters in our simulation. Table 7
illustrates this for a hypothetical expansion year in a hypothetical simulation, in which real GDP
grows 1 percentage point above its trend growth of 1.9 percent and real stock returns are 2
percentage points above their trend return of 8.18
The first row shows how we calculate growth for the individual income tax, which is the mostcomplex case. The first two columns show our estimates of the elasticity of the cyclical
component of the real income tax to the cyclical components of real GDP and real stock returns
respectively, from Table 6. The next two columns show our assumed values for cyclical real GDP
growth and cyclical real stock return values for our hypothetical year, as mentioned above.
The final column shows the calculation of the cyclical component of the income tax: (a) it is
boosted by 1 percentage point because real GDP is growing 1 percentage point above trend,
and the elasticity is 1.0; and it is boosted by another 0.4 percentage points because real stock
returns are 2 percentage points above trend and the elasticity relative to stock returns is 0.2.
Adding the two calculated results, cyclical real income tax growth is 1.4 percentage points
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above trend. Total real income tax growth is the sum of its trend revenue growth plus this
cyclical component.19
The remaining rows of the table illustrate the calculation for the other taxes. This calculation is
much simpler because these taxes generally are not correlated with stock returns and our
models for these taxes do not incorporate stock returns.
Table 7 How we use model parameters to calculate tax revenue growth in the simulations

Constructing tax portfolios for stylized governments
After we model the cyclical behavior of individual taxes, we construct tax portfolios for two stylized

governments, consisting of a mix of income, sales, and other taxes. In Table 5 we showed that
the income tax and the general sales tax are the two largest state government taxes, on
average, and that the property tax dominates local government taxation. Before constructing
stylized governments, it is useful to look at the distribution of the two largest state taxes, as
shown in Figure 6.
Figure 4 Individual income tax and general sales tax shares of state tax revenue
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States clustered in the upper left corner of Figure 6 rely heavily on the sales tax and have no
income tax, including the large states of Florida, Texas, and Washington. These sales-taxdominant states constitute an important group, especially given that the sales tax and the
income tax have different cyclical behaviors, as discussed earlier. Most of the other states rely
partly on the income tax and the sales tax. (Alaska and New Hampshire are the only two states
with no general sales tax and no broad-based income tax.20 Oregon is unique in relying
extremely heavily on the income tax and having no general sales tax.) While there are no other
obvious groupings like the sales-tax dominant states, we think it makes sense to examine states
that rely heavily on the income tax, with some sales tax reliance as well, because several large
states fit this model, including California, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia.
Based upon this analysis, we construct two stylized governments: a sales-tax-dominant state,
relying on the general sales tax for 60 percent of its revenue, with no income tax, and an
income-tax-dominant state, relying on the income tax for 55 percent of its tax revenue and
using a mix of other taxes for the remainder. The tax revenue structure of these stylized
governments is shown in Table 8.
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Table 8 Tax structure of stylized state governments

Tax revenue in these stylized states will reflect the composition of the government’s tax
structure as well as the business cycle and its character.
In our analyses below, we measure the burden of pension contributions as a percentage of tax
revenue for these stylized governments. We also examine a “baseline” government in which tax
revenue grows at a constant rate, and a government in which tax revenue grows at the same
rate as GDP, exhibiting the same cyclical behavior without any further cycle.

Compounded risks from correlated business cycles, investment returns,
and tax revenue
We use our model to examine the potential compounding of risks when investment returns and
governmental tax revenue are driven by the same underlying economic conditions. Our key
modeling assumptions are listed in Table 9.
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Table 9 Key modeling assumptions

We use our economic scenario generator to generate 2,000 simulations of 30 years of
economic growth, using ESG outputs, in turn, to drive tax revenue models and a pension fund
simulation model. Finally, we construct measures of fiscal pressure based upon required
pension contributions and governmental tax revenue.

Illustration of a single simulation
We first illustrate the simulation results using a single simulation (#2) selected from 2,000
stochastic simulation runs.
Figure 5 presents simulated GDP growth and stock returns. The years marked by dashed vertical
lines have at least one quarter in recession21. In this simulation, economic downturns are
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mostly associated with sharp declines in stock returns (the model may generate recessions
without large drops in stock returns in other simulations).
Figure 5 Illustrating the relationship between simulated economic conditions and tax revenues using a single run
of simulation

Figure 6 shows how tax revenues of the two types of stylized governments respond to the
simulated economic conditions. The tax revenue of the income-tax-dominant state is generally
more volatile than tax revenue of the sales-tax-dominant state and has larger declines during
recession periods, consistent with historical patterns.
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Figure 6 Simulated tax revenue growth is more volatile in the income-tax-domiant state than in the sales-taxdominant state

Distribution of growth in real tax revenue
Tax revenue of the income-tax-dominant state is more volatile than tax revenue of the salestax-dominant state, primarily because its revenue responds not only to GDP growth but also to
capital gains driven in large part by stock market returns.
Figure 7 shows the greater volatility of revenues in the income-tax-dominant state by displaying
“violin graphs” of the distributions of total tax revenue growth of the two stylized governments
across all 2,000 simulations and all years. The box inside each figure describes the middle 50
percent of outcomes; the horizontal line in middle of the box marks the median, the line at the
top of the box marks the 75th percentile, and the line at the bottom marks the 25 th percentile.
The median tax revenue growth in the income-tax-dominant state is about 2.4 percent, growth
at the 75th percentile is just over 4 percent, and growth at the 25 th percentile is below 1
percent. The box for the income-tax-dominant state is larger than the box for the sales-taxdominant state, indicating that the income-tax-dominant state had a greater range of growth
rates than the sales tax state; that is, income tax revenue is more volatile than sales tax
revenue. The lines, or “whiskers” of the graph extend up and down from the box, indicating the
90th and 10th percentiles.
The bulges on each graph show the distribution of outcomes, much like a bell curve turned
sideways.
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Figure 7 Simulated tax revenue is more volatile in the income-tax-dominant state than the sales-tax-dominant state

Next, we examine the likelihood of large declines in tax revenue for the two stylized
governments in the 30-year simulation period. Figure 8 shows the probabilities of the stylized
government having experienced a 3 percent or 5 percent drop of tax revenue in a single year up
to a given simulation year. As expected, the income-tax-dominant state is much more likely to
experience a large decline in tax revenue compared to the sales-tax-dominant state.
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Figure 8 Probability of large tax revenue declines is greater in the income-tax-dominant state than in the salestax-dominant state

Simulating the finances of public pension plans
Separately, we have developed a simulation model that can be used to evaluate the
implications of public pension plan investment risk.22 The model calculates the actuarial
liabilities, annual cash flows, funded status, and covered payroll of a public pension plan for
future years based on the benefit rules, actuarial and economic assumptions, and demographic
structure of the plan. Each year the model starts with beginning asset values and computes
ending assets by subtracting benefits paid, adding employee and employer contributions
(including any amortization), and adding investment income, which we calculate in the model.
The model keeps track of these values and other variables of interest, such as the funded ratio
and employer contributions as a percentage of payroll. It saves all results so that they can be
analyzed in any way desired after a simulation run is completed.
The model can be used to examine prototypical pension funds or can be used with data for
actual pension funds. In the analysis that follows, we use a prototypical fund that resembles
real-world pension plans in important ways. The key elements of the prototypical plan are
described below.
•

Plan characteristics. It has a typical age distribution of workers and retirees, and
benefits generally are calculated as 2.2 percentage points per year of service multiplied
by the average of the final three years of salary, plus a 2 percent annual increase akin to
a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA).23 The age structure of the plan population is based
on our analysis of data in the Public Plans Database, and is similar to the population of
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•
•

•

the Arizona State Retirement System24, which we found to be fairly typical in many
ways. We assume that the plan has new hires each year sufficient to allow the plan
workforce to grow by 0.5 percent annually, consistent with the Congressional Budget
Office's assumption of economy-wide growth in the potential labor force. The plan
sponsor makes contributions each year. The plan starts off 75 percent funded with the
actuarially liability calculated using a 7.5 percent discount rate.
Discount rates. (assumed rate of return) 7.5 percent, a common assumption among
public pension plans.
Funding policies. Most pension funds adopt funding policies that can dampen the
volatility in contribution caused by unexpected investment losses and gains and other
deviations from their actuarial assumptions. The choice of funding policy also
determines how fast the plan pays down its Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability
(UAAL). We examine three funding policies with differing smoothing effects on
contributions. The government is assumed to pay full actuarially determined
contributions.
1. 10-year open constant dollar: Unfunded liabilities are paid down rapidly, with
constant-dollar amortization payments calculated over a 10-year open period. The
employer’s contribution in year 1 is 8.67 percent of total tax revenue.
2. 15-year open constant dollar: Unfunded liabilities are paid down less rapidly, over a
15-year open period. The employer’s contribution in year 1 is 7.25 percent of tax
revenue.
3. 30-year open constant percent of payroll: Unfunded liabilities are paid down very
slowly, as a constant percentage of payroll of plan participants over a 30-year open
period. (Several large plans with large unfunded liabilities use this method.) The
employer’s contribution in year 1 is 5 percent of tax revenue.
Investment returns. We examine two sets of stochastic investment returns:
1. Returns generated by the regime-switching simulation model. As described earlier,
the regime-switching model generates 2,000 simulations each with a 30-year series
of equity returns and bond returns, linked to GDP growth. We construct a portfolio
consisting of 70 percent equities and 30 percent bonds.
2. Returns drawn from the normal distribution. The expected annual return and
standard deviation are equal to those of the simulation-based 70/30 portfolio. 2,000
random returns are drawn from the normal distribution for each year in the
simulation.

Given a funding policy and a set of investment returns, we run 2,000 simulations and compute
the required employer contributions, the funded ratio, and other variables of interest of the
prototypical pension plan. This allows us to gain insight into the fiscal stress that the pension
plan creates for the stylized governments by comparing the simulated employer contributions
against the simulated tax revenues.
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Evaluating the potential compounding of risks
By this point, we have tax revenues, asset returns, and pension finances that are all generated
within a coherent simulation framework. Changes in tax revenues and investment returns,
which in turn affect required pension contributions, are both driven by business cycles.
With these simulation outputs of the linked models, we can examine the compounding of risks
from correlated investment returns and tax revenues. We evaluate the pension-related risks for
the two stylized governments, an income-tax-dominant state and a sales-tax-dominant state.
The risk assessments for these two stylized governments are performed and compared under
two models: a baseline model, in which there is no linkage between tax revenue, the economy,
and asset returns; and a model in which tax revenue has the same cyclicality as real GDP. These
comparisons will demonstrate how pension-related risks can be understated if the linkage is
ignored; they also allow us to decompose the differences in estimates of risk.
Using alternative model structures to decompose risks
We constructed alternative model structures to investigate how much of the increase in risk
can be attributed to each of the following: (1) linking tax revenue to the economy, (2) linking
asset returns to the economy, (3) the combined effects of linking tax revenue and asset returns
to the economy, and (4) tax structures of the stylized governments, and the fact that income
tax revenue is linked directly to GDP growth as well as to stock returns, potentially creating
additional risk for the income-tax-dominant state.
The table below summarizes the six model structures we compare.
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Table 10 Simulation models for comparison

Model

Tax revenue Asset return
Based on
Tax revenue
linked to
linked to
stylized
linked to
GDP?
GDP?
government? asset return?

Description

(1)

Unlinked model:
- Constant growth of total tax revenue (equal to trend GDP growth).
- Returns from normal distribution.

No

No

No

No

(2)

Asset return linked only:
- Constant growth of total tax revenue (equal to trend + cycle GDP growth).
- Returns from regime-switching simulation model.

No

Yes

No

No

(3)

Tax revenue linked only:
- Cyclical growth of total tax revenue (equal to trend plus cycle GDP growth).
- Returns from normal distribution.

Yes

No

No

No

(4)

Both tax revenue and asset return linked:
- Cyclical growth of total tax revenue (equal to trend plus cycle GDP growth).
- Returns from regime-switching simulation model.

Yes

Yes

No

No

(5)

Stylized government: sales-tax-dominant state
- Cyclical growth of total tax revenue; estimated responsiveness to GDP growth.
- Returns from regime-switching simulation model.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

(6)

Stylized government: income-tax-dominant state
- Cyclical growth of total tax revenue; estimated responsiveness to GDP growth
and asset return.
- Returns from regime-switching simulation model.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Model (1) serves as the baseline case in which neither tax revenue nor asset return are linked
to the regime-switching process of GDP. It assumes that the total real tax revenue of the
government grows at a constant rate which is equal to the trend growth rate of GDP (1.9
percent) and investment returns are normally distributed.
Model (2) only links asset returns to GDP cycles. Governmental tax revenue still grows at a
constant rate.
Model (3) only links tax revenue to the economy. Asset returns still are drawn from a normal
distribution. The simulation results of Models 2 and 3 reflect the isolated effects of linking only
one variable to the business cycle.
Model (4) links both tax revenue and asset returns to GDP cycles and reflects the compounding
effects of correlated tax revenue and asset returns. In Models (4), as in Model (4), the growth
rate of total tax revenue equals the total GDP growth rate (trend plus cycle).
Models (5) and (6) also link both tax revenue and asset returns to business cycles, but they
differ from Model (4) in that they incorporate our analysis of how tax revenues respond to
business cycles for the two stylized governments – the sales-tax-dominant state in Model (5),
and the income-tax-dominant state in Model (6). A distinguishing feature of Model (6) is that
the dominant tax category – personal income tax – is linked not only to GDP growth, but also to
stock market returns.
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Measures of potential fiscal pressure
Under each of the six model structures, actuarially determined pension contributions are
generated by our pension simulation model under three alternative funding policies (see
section Simulating the finances of public pension plans). We treat actuarially determined
contributions as required employer contributions, although governments do not always pay
them. Employer contributions as a percentage of the total tax revenue in the first simulation
year are determined as follows:
•

•
•

We calibrate total tax revenue in year 1 so that the required employer contribution
under the “30-year open constant percent of payroll” policy is 5 percent of total tax
revenue in year 1.
The total tax revenue calculated based on this assumption is then used for the other
two policies, so that tax revenue is the same across contribution policies.
Thus, the employer contribution as a percentage of total tax revenue in year 1 is 5
percent under the “30-year open constant percent of payroll” policy, 7.3 percent under
the “15-year open constant dollar” policy, and 8.7 percent under the “10-year open
constant dollar” policy.

We examine two types of risks that the sponsoring governments of public pension plans may
face:
1. The risk that required employer contributions become very high relative to fiscal
resources available to the sponsoring government, creating great fiscal pressure and
potentially crowding out other public services. In our analysis of the simulation results,
we measure this type of risk by the probability that employer contributions as a
percentage of total tax revenue will become more than 5 percentage points higher than
the level in year 1 at any time during the 30-year simulation period.
2. The risk that required employer contributions rise sharply in a short period of time,
creating difficulty in budget planning and short-term fiscal pressure. We measure this
type of risk by the probability that employer contribution rises more than 3 percent of
total tax revenue in a 2-year period at any time during the 30-year simulation period.
Our 3-percent- and 5-percent-of-tax-revenue thresholds for our two risk measures are
arbitrary, but we think they are broadly indicative of tax-revenue changes that cause fiscal
stress. They are based in part upon our experience analyzing and participating in state budget
decision making over several decades. One way to think about this is to examine tax revenue
shortfalls in recessions. In the first two years of the 1990, 2001, and 2007 recessions, tax
revenue in the median state fell short by about 3.6 percent, 13 percent, and 14 percent,
respectively.25 From this perspective, our two-year risk measure involves less fiscal pressure
than tax shortfalls in recent recessions, but given that pension contributions typically only are
three to seven percent of state tax revenue, the risk measure will only be triggered if
contributions increase very significantly. Our longer-term risk measure is larger than our short34

term indicator, but it will only be triggered if there is a sizable shift in the use of tax revenue
over a long period of time.
Another way of thinking about the risk measures is to conduct sensitivity analysis, using
different (but still arbitrary) thresholds, to see whether alterative measures lead to different
conclusions about the impact of considering linkages between the economy, investment
returns, and tax revenue. We discuss the results of sensitivity analysis in the next section;
alternative thresholds do not change any of our fundamental conclusions.

Summary of simulation results
The risk of high employer contributions
Table 11 shows the risk of employer contributions rising by 5 percentage points or more relative
to the starting point under our different models and funding policies. The three rows of the
table show our three funding policies and the six columns show the size of the risk under our six
models.
The first column presents the risk measure when tax revenue grows smoothly over time
without any business cycle effects, and investment returns are normally distributed and
independent over time, without any correlation to the economy. There is a 6.8 percent chance
that employer contributions will rise by more than 5 percentage points of tax revenue above
their year 1 levels at some point during the 30-year simulation period – a smaller risk than in
any column to the right.
The second column also assumes that tax revenue grows smoothly, but now investment returns
are generated by the regime-switching simulation model that results in a heavier left tail in the
return distribution than in the normal distribution, and returns are correlated with economic
conditions rather than being independent over time. Thus, comparing this column to column 1
shows us the pure effect of linking investment returns to the economy, without considering tax
revenue cyclicality, shedding light on the impact of introducing non-normality in investment
returns. The risks of high employer contributions are only slightly higher than in the base case.
Column 3 now allows tax revenue to be exactly as cyclical as real GDP. For example, if real GDP
grows 2 percentage points more quickly than its trend, tax revenue will grow at the same rate.
Investment returns are drawn from the normal distribution rather than being generated by our
ESG. Thus, comparing column 3 to column 1 shows us the pure effect of introducing volatility in
tax revenue that is not correlated with investment returns, without accounting for differences
in tax structure. The risks are slightly greater than in the base case and not much different from
those in column 2.
Column 4 allows tax revenue to be exactly as cyclical as real GDP and has investment returns
generated by the model:
•

Comparing column 4 to column 3 shows the risk introduced by having investment
returns linked to the economy in addition to cyclical tax revenue.
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•

•

Comparing column 4 to column 2 shows the risk introduced by having cyclical revenue.
In either comparison, the increase in risk is quite large. For example, under a 10-year
open constant-dollar funding policy, the risk of a contribution increase that is at least 5
percentage points of tax revenue is 17.8 percent, or more than a one in six chance of
such an increase during the 30-year simulation period.
Comparing column 4 to column 1 demonstrates that while the isolated effects of linking
tax revenue or investment returns to the business cycle are modest, the compounding
effect of correlated tax revenue and investment returns is quite large. For example,
under the 15-year open constant dollar funding policy, the risk of high pension
contribution is 2.7 times as great much as in column 1 (17.2 percent compared to 6.4
percent), while for columns 2 and 3 the measures are only 1.4 and 1.5 times as great.

Columns 5 and 6 introduce our two stylized governments, with tax revenue cycles depending
not just on real GDP cycles but also on tax structure. In both models, returns are generated by
the economic scenario generator. The risks for the sales-tax-dominant government actually are
slightly smaller than if revenue is exactly as cyclical as real GDP.26 The risks for the income-taxdominant state are much larger: the risk of a large employer contribution is 22.8 percent,
compared to 16.5 percent for the sales-tax-dominant state, and compared to 6.8 percent for
the base case where neither investment returns nor tax revenue are linked to the economy –
the kinds of simulations that we have reported on in past papers.
Table 11 Risk of high pension contribution relative to tax revenue

Comparing risks as we move down the rows of Table 11 also is instructive, as it shows the
interplay between funding policy and contribution risk. Risks of large employer contributions
fall somewhat as the funding policy lengthens, particularly as we move from 15 years to 30
years and change from constant-dollar funding to constant-percentage-of-pay funding. Because
this risk measure compares every year in a 30-year simulation to the starting year, it is a
measure of longer-term risks, and funding policies that smooth contributions have only limited
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ability to reduce this risk. They have much greater ability to reduce the risk of large employer
contributions in a short period of time, as discussed below.
To examine the sensitivity of our conclusions to our 5-percent-of-tax-revenue threshold, we
constructed two additional tables that are in the same form as Table 11, but one was calculated
with a 3 percent threshold and the other was calculated with a 7 percent threshold. While the
numbers all differ from those calculated with the 5 percent threshold, the qualitative
conclusions do not change: risks of high contributions are significantly greater when we
consider the impact of correlations among GDP cycles, investment return cycles, and tax
revenue cycles, and risks for the income-tax-dominant stylized government are considerably
greater than for the sales-tax-dominant stylized government.
The risk of large contribution increases in a short period of time
Table 12 presents our short-term risk measure – the probability that employer contributions will
rise by more than three percent of tax revenue in any two-year period during our 30-year
simulation - for the same models and funding policies. The format and interpretation are the
same as for Table 11.
As with our other risk measure, the risk increases as we move to the right in the table, but not
as much as with our longer-term risk measure, the risk of a large contribution increase over the
30-year period. Furthermore, risks of sharp increases in employer contributions diminish
dramatically as we move down the rows of the table, lengthening the contribution smoothing
period and liberalizing the policy by using constant-percentage of pay funding. Long smoothing
periods and more-liberal funding policies reduce short-term employer contribution risks
substantially. As with our first risk measure, we also conducted sensitivity analysis of our largecontribution-increases-in-a-short-period risk measure. We examined thresholds based upon 2
percent of tax revenue and 4 percent of tax revenue, as alternatives to our measure reported
on here based upon 3 percent of tax revenue. As with the first risk measure, our fundamental
conclusions do not change.
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Table 12 Risk of sharp increases in pension contributions retaltive to tax revenue

Contribution smoothing policies can reduce employer risks, but they do not make risks go away:
they transfer them to the pension fund and its stakeholders, as we discuss in the next section.
Contribution-smoothing policies cannot make risks go away: They transfer risks from
governments to pension plans
Lower risks for sponsoring governments under funding policies with stronger contributionsmoothing effects come at the expense of higher risk that the pension plan will become
severely underfunded, as Table 13 demonstrates.
The first column of Table 13 ties to the fourth column of Table 12 to provide a useful point of
reference, showing how the risk of sharp increases in employer contributions declines as the
funding period lengthens and the policy liberalizes. The last column shows the risk that the
plan’s funded ratio will fall below 40 percent, which we consider to be crisis territory, at some
point during the 30-year simulation period. (We will explain the intervening columns in a
minute.) As we move down the rows, the risk of this crisis-level funding rises from 7.1 percent
with 10-year constant-dollar funding policy to 30.9 percent, or nearly a one in three chance,
with 30-year constant percent of payroll funding. (This latter risk is far greater than risks we
estimated in earlier papers, when investment returns were not linked to economic conditions.)
The risk protection that governments gain from stretched-out funding policies results in greater
risk to pension plans.
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Table 13 Greater contribution smoothing leads to higher risk of pension underfunding

Conclusion
In this paper we examine how our assessment of risks to pension funds and their sponsoring
governments changes when we take into consideration the correlation between economic
conditions, investment returns, and governmental tax revenue. We do this by linking an
economic scenario generator - a small stochastic macroeconomic model that simulates real
GDP growth and investment returns – to models of tax revenue cyclicality and a pension
finance simulation model. Our paper builds upon other recent research that has examined risks
to pension funds and governments under alternative economic scenarios.
The simulation results demonstrate that it is important to allow for correlation among
economic conditions, investment returns, and tax revenue when examining the investmentrelated risks to public pension funds and the sponsoring governments. Contribution increases
required after economic downturns are much larger, relative to tax revenue, when we allow tax
revenue to be cyclical (varying with the economy) than under simpler assumptions of stable tax
revenue growth.
Pension-related risks for governments can be further exacerbated by how state tax revenue
structures respond to economic conditions. All else equal, income-tax-dominant states, with
highly cyclical tax revenue, face higher pension-related risks than sales-tax-dominant states,
which have less-cyclical tax revenues.
The choice of funding policies for public pension funds also has a significant impact on the risks
that sponsoring governments face. Funding policies that pay down unfunded liabilities slowly
and have strong smoothing effects on contribution requirements can protect the sponsoring
governments from the risks of high pension contributions in the near term, or of sharp
increases in contributions, at the expense of greatly increasing the risk of severe underfunding
for the pension funds.
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This paper shows how important it is to incorporate budgetary resources in pension fund risk
analysis, and how that analysis can be deepened by modeling business cycles and investment
returns together. Our work in this area is preliminary and can be extended and improved upon.
What do the insights from this work mean for larger efforts underway to encourage pension
funds and governments to conduct stress testing and to report on risks to plan beneficiaries,
legislators, citizens, and taxpayers? This paper highlights that these risks are even larger than
commonly understood, and that these efforts are all the more important.
Stress testing and risk reporting are, we hope, the wave of the future. The recent trend has
been in that direction. The Society of Actuaries called for stress testing in its 2014 Blue Ribbon
Panel report. While relatively few plans and states conduct risk reporting as a matter of course,
more have been doing so, with several states now requiring it. The Actuarial Standards Board
recently has encouraged greater reporting on risks with proposed actuarial standards of
practice. More states and plans should follow this lead.
First steps that plans and governments are taking now are important, with simple measures
that plans can readily calculate and the public can easily understand. Comparisons to economic
and revenue resources assuming stable growth are an important part of those steps, as are
stress testing under asset and economic shock scenarios. Integrated stochastic analysis of the
impact of business cycles and the economy, such as we do here, can be adapted to plans and
governments and can further deepen risk reporting and stress testing. It not need not be part
of a first step, but it should not delay first steps. Understanding and assessing risks are
necessary first steps toward managing risks.
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Technical Appendix
Introduction and project goals
This project continues and extends the Rockefeller Institute’s pension simulation modeling, by
developing a small integrated model of the economy and investment returns that we link to a
pension fund simulation model. This approach allows determination of economic variables,
including governmental tax bases, and investment returns, in a joint cohesive framework.
This is important for several reasons. Perhaps the most important reason is that governmental
tax bases are affected by some of the same economic phenomena that influence investment
returns. Intuitively, many people believe that governments are called on to pay increased
contributions at the worst time, after economic variables have caused not just poor investment
performance, but also deterioration in tax bases. Current stochastic simulations do not take this
relationship into account and may understate the likelihood that employer contributions will
become large relative to governmental resources. When contributions become especially large
governments may be less willing to make full actuarially determined contributions. Determining
investment returns and economic variables jointly will make it possible to assess risks to
pension funds and governments more realistically than otherwise.
Our model building and simulation has the following steps:
1. Build an integrated economic scenario generator that allows us to construct internally
consistent simulations of real GDP and returns on several asset classes, far into the
future, following paths over time that reflect parameters estimated from historical data.
(Future versions of the model also will forecast and simulate inflation.) By incorporating
random errors, we simulate thousands of such paths.
2. Use outputs from the economic scenario generator as inputs to:
a. A pension fund simulation model, which yields as outputs information on funded
status of the plan and contribution requirements by governments.
b. A model of the revenue resources of a small set of stylized governments that
illustrate the great diversity of tax bases that different governments rely on.
These simulations will affect the revenue resources of different stylized
governments in different ways. For example, some economic scenarios will
affect the revenue of a stylized income-tax-dependent government very
differently than they will affect the revenue of a sales-tax-dependent or
property-tax-dependent stylized government.
3. Combine the pension fund simulations (2.a) and the revenue-resource simulations (2.b)
to analyze the stress that pension contribution requirements may place upon the
finances of governments, taking into account the potential relationships between
investment returns and tax revenue in a way that has not been done by other
researchers.
41

4. Examine policy options that are best analyzed in a stochastic framework, ideally
including real economic variables as well as asset returns. For example, policy options in
which COLAs or other contingent benefits depend upon plan funded status require such
a framework.
The major components of the model are summarized in Figure 9. The combined macroeconomic
and stochastic investment model enables us to analyze important public policy issues such as
stress-testing for pension funds27, and addressing or managing the cyclical relationship between
pension fund finances and governmental finances.
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Figure 9 Structure of linked models
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Building an integrated economic scenario generator
Economists and actuaries often build small economic models that include investment returns
by asset classes, and one or more other variables such as inflation, or real GDP, or other
economic variables. They use these models to generate multiple future economic scenarios –
perhaps thousands of scenarios – by varying the random errors in the model. In this context,
the models often are called Economic Scenario Generators (ESGs). Analysts use them for risk
analysis or management – for example, to examine bank capital adequacy or, in our case, to
examine risks to pension funds and their sponsors.
Literature review
Patterns of historical asset returns
Time-varying patterns of asset returns
It is well documented in the literature that the expected return and volatility of major asset
classes exhibit time-varying patterns, which can be usually described by stochastic regimeswitching processes. Regime-switching models assume that the behavior of asset returns
randomly switches between several “states” in which returns have distinct return-risk profiles.
Hardy (2001) modeled the US and Canadian large-cap stock returns as a two-regime process:
one with high expected return and low volatility and the other with low expected return and
high volatility.28 They found that the regime-switching model can capture the observed extreme
returns and clustered high volatility periods better than the conventional normal models and
other more sophisticated time-series models.
Guidolin and Timmermann (2006) also found that a two-regime process can drive large and
small firms’ stock returns, while a three-regime model is chosen for bond returns, with the
states only weakly correlated the regimes of stocks, showing that stock and bond returns are
governed by very different regime-switching patterns and more complex models are needed to
describe the joint distribution of stock and bond returns. 29
Other examples of using regime-switching models to examine stock returns include Ryden et al.
(1998), Turner et al. (1989), and Whitelaw (2001).30
Time-varying correlation across asset classes
Correlation of investment returns across asset classes, or lack thereof, is the source of the
benefits of portfolio diversification. There is evidence that correlations across asset classes are
not time-invariant, implying that an asset allocation assuming constant correlation may fail to
provide the anticipated benefits of diversification during certain time periods.
Sheikh and Qiao (2009) examined, among other topics, the correlation breakdown in joint asset
class returns and found that the returns of almost all major asset classes become more
correlated during periods with high market volatility, which means the “diversification may not
materialize precisely when an investor needs it the most”.31
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Jammazi et al. (2015) examined the time-varying patterns of the dependences between stock
and long-term government bond returns for a wide range of developed economies.32 They
observed that the stock-bond association was positive during 1990s and the became negative
from the early 2000s, which supports the presence of flight-to-quality effects during the two
recessions in 2000s.
Guidolin and Timmermann (2006) examined the complexity of modeling the joint process of
stock and bond returns and found that a four-regime model is required to capture the timevariation in the mean, variance and correlation between stock and long-term bond returns.
Non-normality of asset returns
Simulation modelers often assume that investment returns are normally distributed, and
independent over time, so that current returns are not dependent upon past returns. We have
made these assumptions in much of our work. Real-world investment returns can differ from
these assumptions in several important ways.
Fat tails
Investment returns are said to have “fat tails” if the probabilities of particularly good outcomes
or of particularly bad outcomes are greater than what we would expect if returns were
distributed normally. If the investment returns have fat left tails, then the probability of
particularly bad outcomes is greater than if returns were distributed normally. If investment
returns have fat right tails, then the probability of particularly good outcomes is greater than if
returns were distributed normally.
Sheikh and Qiao (2009) show that the historical monthly returns of all major asset classes
exhibit fat left tails compared to the normal distribution. Their work also suggests that fat tails
are far less prominent for annual returns than for returns at higher frequencies, such as
monthly and quarterly.
Mean-reversion
Mean reversion in asset returns occurs if periods of high returns or low returns are followed by
an eventual reversion to longer-term norms. There has been a great deal of academic research
into the question of mean reversion, and the results are mixed. Much of the work is specific to
stock market returns, although our concern must be broader: The sometimes-argued
presumption that pension funds will eventually get their returns typically pertains to portfolios
as a whole, not just stocks.
Two early, frequently cited papers by Poterba and Summers (1988) and by Fama and French
(1988) concluded that there was evidence of long-term mean reversion in stock market returns
between 1926 and 1985, generally for period lengths of three-five years.33 Recent research
generally concludes that either there is no evidence for long-term mean reversion, or that the
evidence is mixed and has been limited to specific markets such as United States equities
(Jorion, 2003),34 or that mean reversion is more than offset by other factors (Dimson et al.
2013, Pastor and Stambaugh, 2012).35
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How time-varying characteristics of asset returns are related to business cycles
To evaluate how fluctuations in investment returns would translate into pension funding
pressures on sponsoring governments, it is key to understand how the regime-switching
behaviors of asset returns are related to the boom-and-bust cycles of the real economy, which
in turn affects the fiscal conditions of governments that sponsor pension plans.
Hamilton and Lin (1998) investigate the joint behavior of monthly stock return volatility and
growth in industrial production using bi-variate models and conclude that the fluctuations in
stock return volatility are primarily driven by economic recessions.36
Guidolin and Timmermann (2006) construct a four-regime model to describe the joint behavior
of stock and long-term bond returns and observe that the high volatility regimes occur around
NBER recession periods.
Andersen et al. (2004) found that correlation between stock and bond returns switches sign in
expansion versus recession.37
Other studies that have identified the correlation between asset return regimes and business
cycles include Vervurrt (2016), Nyberg (2012), and, Dzikevicius & Vetrov (2013).38
Two broad approaches to models of GDP and investment returns: Cascading models, and
interdependent models
Economic scenario generators can be used to produce plausible stochastic future paths of
economic and financial variables that are relevant to the finances of public pension funds and
the sponsoring government. The key economic variables include GDP growth, short-term and
long-term interest rates and returns of major asset classes including equity, bond, and real
estate. (Future versions of our model also will forecast and simulate inflation.) Such a model
should be (1) capable of capturing the long-term joint distribution of relevant economic and
financial variables, and (2) as parsimonious as possible so that it is practical to estimate based
on moderate amounts of historical data.
We examined two commonly used approaches to constructing economic scenario generators:
cascading models where each equation is independent of the others, and interdependent
models where equations are not independent.
Cascading models: The Wilkie model and its variants
One approach to ESG models has a cascade-structure in which economic and financial variables
are driven by a set of core variables through a series of time series regression equations. The
model proceeds sequentially: for example, this period’s inflation may drive next period’s stock
returns and next period’s bond yields, but stock and bond returns do not influence each other
directly.
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Wilkie (1986) developed the first comprehensive economic scenario generator of this type in
which inflation serves as the core variable and drives the dynamics of stock returns and longterm bond yield.39 The Wilkie model was then extended to incorporate more variables including
short-term bond yields, real estate prices, and wage inflation (Wilkie 1995).40 Among many
economic scenario generation models following Wilkie’s approach, Hibbert et al. (2001) and
Ahlgrim et al. (2004) specify the dynamics of equity return as a regime-switching Markov
process, which captures the time-varying characteristics of equity returns.41
Markov-switching vector autoregressive model (MS-VAR)
We also consider an economic scenario generator driven by the Markov-switching
autoregression model (MS-VAR) (Harris, 1999), which simultaneously models the dynamics and
interdependence of all variables of interest.42 Sherris and Zhang (2009) developed an economic
scenario generator based on a MS-VAR model of 11 variables with CPI and unemployment rates
being selected to be regime-switching and calibrated it to quarterly data of Australia.43
Comparison of the two approaches
Each of the two types of economic scenario generation models - a cascade-structure model and
an MS-VAR model – has advantages and disadvantages, and there is little research that
compares the performance of these models as engines for an economic scenario generator. The
cascade-structure model relies on economic and financial theory to a greater extent and has a
more parsimonious structure compared with the MS-VAR model, which makes the cascadestructure model easier to estimate and interpret. Moreover, because many parameters in the
model have explicit economic interpretations, it is easier to generate meaningful alternative
simulations by altering model parameters for specific variables of interest. However, the
potential misspecification of the theory-based interdependence in the model may compromise
its ability to capture the joint-distributions of variables in historical data. By contrast, the MSVAR model is generally data-driven and takes a more flexible structure, which gives it better
potential to capture the joint distribution of key variables and their time-varying characteristics.
But the MS-VAR model is more difficult to estimate and interpret.
Existing models of these types mostly focus on inflation and interest rates. For our purpose, we
also need to incorporate real economic activity, which is associated with governmental tax
bases and affects tax revenue of sponsoring governments of public pension funds. Moody’s
Analytics has developed an economic scenario generator based on Hardy et al. (2001) that has
GDP growth as one of the output variables. But the methodology of incorporating GDP is not
described in the original paper. Moore and Pederson (2013) modeled economic regimes only,
while we also need to model and simulate the path of economic growth44.
In this report, we focus on the Markov-switching modeling approach for the following reasons.
First, preliminary modeling and simulation results show that the Markov-switching models can
better capture the joint distribution of economic growth and asset returns compared with
Wilkie’s cascading modeling approach. Second, one of the core variables that drives the
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cascading models is inflation, while in the report we mainly focus on variables in real terms and
do not model inflation explicitly.
Historical patterns in data that we will model
In the sections that follow, we describe historical patterns in key variables of interest: GDP
growth, and returns on stocks and bonds. The quarterly United States GDP series from 1953Q1
to 2017Q4 is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). The total return
indices of U.S. stocks, long-term government bonds and long-term corporate bonds from 1926
to 2015 are obtained from the SBBI Yearbook 2016.45 The stock total return, which is based on
the S&P Composite Index, consists of capital appreciation return and dividend income return. 46
The long-term government bond return index and long-term corporate bond return index are
calculated based on bonds with terms of approximately 20 years. The bond total returns
include both interest income and capital appreciation due to changes in yields. Monthly total
return indices of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds are provided in the SBBI
Yearbook, which are converted to quarterly indices by using March, June, October, and
December values, and to annual indices by using June values. The common sample period for
GDP and asset return series of 1953Q1 to 2015Q4 is used for modeling.
Analysis of individual variables
Table 14 presents descriptive statistics for annual and quarterly GDP growth and asset returns.
The table includes the mean and standard deviation, and two measures of the shape of the
distribution, skewness and excess kurtosis.
Skewness is a measure of symmetry. If it is zero, the distribution is symmetric. If it is negative,
the distribution has a long tail to the left, and if it is positive, the distribution has a long tail to
the right (the greater the magnitude of the measure, the more the distribution tails to left or
right).
Kurtosis measures the heaviness of the tail of a distribution – the greater the value, the heavier
the tail. The value in our table is adjusted so that it is the excess over the kurtosis of the
standard normal distribution. Distributions with excess kurtosis greater than zero have fatter
tails than the standard normal distribution, and distributions with excess kurtosis less than zero
have lighter tails than the standard normal distribution. Kurtosis can be heavily influenced by a
few extreme observations.
The excess kurtosis measure in Table 1 provides evidence for fat tails for all quarterly variables,
while fat tails are less prominent for annual data.
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Table 14 Summary statistics of key variables

Figure 10 shows special plots that compare the empirical distributions of these variables against
the normal distribution, known as “Q-Q plots”. These plots show on the horizontal axis the
percentiles of observations that we would expect to see if the variable was normally
distributed. On the vertical axis, they show the percentiles that we observe in our data. The
data points would locate very close to the 45° line if the data were normally distributed.)
While the issue of fat tails is frequently raised in discussions of modeling stock returns, we saw
in Table 14 the kurtosis of quarterly and annual stock total returns is relatively low. However,
fat lower tails are visually prominent in the Q-Q plots of stock returns, especially for quarterly
stock returns. In other words, we have observed more frequent large negative stock returns
than we would expect if stock returns were normally distributed. This suggests it could be
important to capture this non-normality when modeling pension fund returns, which has not
generally been done by pension simulation modelers.
The distribution of GDP growth shows fat tails in both lower and higher ends. Long-term bond
total return exhibits fat tails only in the upper end of its distribution, implying that extreme
positive bond returns occur more frequently than a normal distribution would suggest.
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Figure 10 The historical distributions of GDP growth and stock returns show fat tails, which are more prominent
in quarterly data than in annual data.

How variables move together over time
Next, we examine the historical paths of stock and bond returns and their relationship with
economic growth and business cycles. Figure 2 shows 12-quarter moving average return and
standard deviation for stock total return (upper panel) and long-term government bond return
(lower panel), along with moving average GDP growth. The shaded areas indicate recession
periods defined by National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Figure 2(a) shows that stock total return has experienced sharp declines and elevated volatility
in most severe economic downturns after 1970. In contrast, the pattern of long-term
government bond turns is not aligned with economic cycles in a consistent manner. Although
the volatility of government bond returns surged abruptly during the economic downturns in
the early 1980s and in the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009, in other periods government bond
returns and volatility show very little correlation with business cycles.
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Figure 11 The patterns of stock returns and volatility usually synchronizes with business cycles, while the
patterns of bond returns generally do not.

(a)

(b)
Figure 12 shows that the correlation between stock returns and long-term government bond

returns varies widely over time. The stock-bond correlation started negative in 1950s and early
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1960s, then become mostly positive from 1965 through the end of 1990s before turning
negative again after 2000. This time-varying pattern of stock-bond correlation is consistent with
the results of Jammazi et al. (2015), who employed more sophisticated statistical models to
examine the time-varying dependences of stock and bond returns in developed economies.
Figure 12 The correlation between stock returns and long-term government bond returns varies widely over time

Modeling GDP growth and asset returns
In this section, we describe the individual equations in our macroeconomic model (i.e.,
economic scenario generator). We have two main equations in the current version of the
model: an equation for real GDP growth, and an equation for nominal stock returns. We have
not modeled bond returns econometrically, because of their minimal historical relationship to
business cycles. Instead, when we produce economic scenarios, we construct stochastic bond
returns that are consistent with their historical correlations with stock returns.
Modeling GDP growth
In Hamilton’s (1989) seminal paper that introduced Markov-switching models, the US GNP
series was modeled as an autoregressive model of order 4 with the mean switching between
two regimes (economic expansion and recession). The model can be described as follows:
𝑦t = 𝜇𝑆𝑡 + 𝜙1 (y𝑡−1 − 𝜇𝑆𝑡−1 ) + 𝜙2 (y𝑡−2 − 𝜇𝑆𝑡−2 ) + 𝜙3 (y𝑡−3 − 𝜇𝑆𝑡−3 ) + 𝜙4 (y𝑡−4 − 𝜇𝑆𝑡−4 ) + 𝜀 𝑡
𝜀𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 )

where yt is the quarterly growth rate of GNP, µSt denotes the mean of the process in time
period t with St being the regime the process belongs to in t. The innovation term εt follows the
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normal distribution and is independent across time periods. In each time period, the regime
transitions following the matrix of transition probabilities,
𝑝11
[𝑝
12

𝑝21
𝑝22 ]

where pij is the probability of transitioning from regime i to regime j.
We first examine the regime-switching behavior of the US GDP series by applying the regimeswitching autoregression model described above to the quarterly GDP growth series from
1953Q2 to 2015Q4. The first row of Table 15 shows the estimated model parameters along
with the expected durations of expansion (regime 1) and recession (regime 2) implied by the
estimated transition probabilities. The estimated mean quarterly GDP growth rates are 0.88
percent in expansion regime and -1.15 percent in recession regime. There are two noteworthy
issues with the estimation results. First, the expected duration of recession regimes implied by
the transition probabilities is 1.44 quarters, which is much shorter than the average duration of
recession of 3.7 quarters based on the historical data on the same sample period. Second, the
estimated parameters of the third and the forth autoregression terms are not statistically
significant.
To explore whether there are model specifications that can better capture the historical
patterns of economic expansion and recession, we fit two alternative model specifications:
The estimation results of these two alternative models are presented in the second and third
row of Table 15 respectively. Model (2) gives estimates of regime-specific means, variance, and
expected duration of the recession regime that are very similar to those for the Hamilton
model. Model (3) produces expected durations of recession and expansion regimes that are
close to the historical data, and a slightly higher estimate for the mean growth rate of the
recession regime.
Theoretically, the Markov-switching models with autoregressive terms can be more suitable for
describing quarterly GDP series because it allows for smoother transition between regimes and
mean-reversion within regimes. By contrast, the random walk with Markov-switching drift term
assumes abrupt changes across regimes and no mean reversion within regimes. Although the
Markov-switching autoregression models have the theoretical merits above, they tend to
greatly underestimate the expected length of recession periods (see Table 15), while the
estimates by the model of random walk with Markov-switching drift are more consistent with
historical data. Because capturing the general historical pattern of economic regimes is more
important for our final goal, in this study we use Model (3) for simulation. We plan to run
sensitivity analysis to see the impact of introducing AR terms into the model.
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Table 15 The estimation results of the GDP growth model of random walk with a Markov-switching drift term
are more consistent with the historical durations of recessions and expansions.
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Figure 13 The estimation results of the GDP growth model of random walk with a Markov-switching drift term
are more consistent with the historical durations of recessions and expansions.

Modeling stock returns
Stock returns are generally considered to be a random walk process with drift. Research has
shown that stock returns exhibit regime-switching behavior, and the stock-return regimes can
be correlated with the business cycle. Following Hardy (2001), we model stock total returns as a
random walk with a Markov-switching drift term and variance.
yt = 𝜇𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ;

𝜀𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑆𝑡 2 )

The two-state model has identified two regimes: a high-return-low-volatility regime, and a lowreturn-high-volatility regime. We examine the extent to which stock-return regimes are aligned
55

with regimes of GDP growth in Table 16. The first row shows estimated model parameters for
the regime-specific mean stock return and standard deviation. We also examine the transition
probabilities and implied average duration of regimes in the last four columns of Table 16. The
second row of the table shows the average stock return and standard deviation in expansion
and recession periods defined by NBER.
The probability of stock returns entering a low-return-high-volatility regime is about twice as
high as the probability of GDP growth entering a recession regime suggested by the Model (3)
of GDP. The expected duration of the low-return regime (3.36 quarters) is very close to the
average duration of economic recessions (3.7 quarters), while the expected duration of the
high-return regime is about half the length of the average duration of GDP expansion.
The model results show that economic recessions are almost always accompanied by periods of
low return and high volatility in stock market. While the low-return and high-volatility regime of
stock return may occasionally occur without an economic downturn.
Table 16 Expected returns and volatility of the 2 regimes detected by the Markov-switching model of stock

We first examine how the smoothed probabilities of low-return-high-volatility regime are
aligned with NBER recession and expansion periods (Figure 14). There are 13 peaks in the
probability of low-return regime, 7 of them are approximately aligned with the recession
periods, and most of the other 6 peaks occur around recessions periods (exceptions are peaks
in 1966 and 1987, where there were no economic downturn).
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Figure 14 Economic recessions are almost always accompanied by periods of low return and high volatility in
stock market, while the low-return and high-volatility regime of stock return may occasionally occur without an
economic downturn

Modeling bond returns
We have not modeled bond returns econometrically, because of their weak historical
relationships to business cycles. Instead, when we produce economic scenarios, we construct
stochastic bond returns that have correlations to stock returns that are consistent with
historical correlations.
Preliminary analysis results show that the historical patterns in bond returns are generally not
related to business cycles; and the time-varying pattern of the stock-bond dependences shows
little correlation with business cycles. There can be modest serial correlation in long-term
government bond returns. The unconditional distribution of bond return is quite close to
normal distribution except for the upper end of the distribution. There are occasional extreme
positive values in long-term bond returns.
Simulation of GDP growth and asset returns
Simulation Approach
Based on the econometric analysis described in the previous section, we constructed an
economic scenario generator that can produce stochastic simulations of future paths of growth
in real GDP, total stock market returns, and total returns on long-term bonds.
We conducted two types of simulations using the economic scenario generator - backwardlooking simulations and forward-looking simulations. The backward-looking simulations are
mainly used for model validation purpose – we use model parameters estimated from historical
data and examine the simulation results to see to what extent the simulation model can
reproduce the historical patterns of the variables of interest. The simulation horizon of
backward-looking simulations is 63 years (252 quarters), which is consistent with the sample
period (1953Q1 – 2015Q4) used for parameter estimation. In contrast, the forward-looking
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simulations are used to shed light on the public-pension-related risks the sponsoring
governments may face in the future, which is the ultimate purpose of this paper. it would not
be appropriate to set the simulation parameters directly based on the model parameters
estimated from historical data because the historical trends and patterns do not necessarily
extend to the future. For example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the
average annual growth rate of potential GDP in the next 30 years will be 1.9 percent,47 which is
much lower than the historical average GDP growth rate of about 3 percent. Therefore,
forward-looking assumptions for the economic variables should be incorporated into the
simulation parameters. To do so, we made adjustments to the estimated model parameters to
ensure that the simulation results are generally consistent with a set of forward-looking
assumptions constructed based our review of external studies. (see below for more detailed
discussion). The simulation horizon for the forward-looking simulations is 30 years.
In each simulation, the model generates 2,000 stochastic paths for real GDP growth, total stock
returns and total long-term bond returns. The simulation model produces quarterly outputs,
which are then converted to annual values.
The model specifications and simulation parameters for the three simulated variables are
described below. (The forward-looking simulation parameters are provided in Table 17, the
unadjusted historical-data based parameters that are different from the forward-looking
parameters pare provided in the footnote of the table.)
Real GDP growth. Simulations of quarterly real GDP growth rates are generated using the
random walk with a Markov-switching drift term model (Model (3) in section Modeling GDP
growth), which we found can best capture the general historical pattern of expansions and
recessions. Key simulation parameters include 1) the transition matrix that provides regimeswitching probabilities, 2) expected quarterly GDP growth rates in expansion and recession
regimes, 3) standard deviation of disturbance term. For the backward-looking simulations, the
parameter values estimated based on the historical data from 1953Q1 to 2015Q4 are used. For
the forward-looking simulations, we adopt CBO (2017)’s 30-year projection of potential GDP
growth in the U.S., which is 1.9 percent, as our target expected annual GDP growth rate. This
target rate is 1.1 percent lower than the average annual GDP growth in the sample period of
1953-2015. To achieve this target, we calibrated downward the parameters for expected
quarterly GDP growth rates in expansions and recessions such that the median of the 30-year
geometric mean annual GDP growth of the 2,000 simulations is approximately equal to 1.9
percent.
Total stock returns. Simulations of quarterly total stock returns are generated by a Markovswitching model. It is assume that the high-return-low-volatility regime and low-return-highvolatility regime of stock returns are perfectly aligned with the expansion and recession
regimes of GDP growth. In other words, when producing economic scenarios, the simulated
regimes of GDP growth are also applied to stock returns, with the expansion regimes of GDP
serving as the high-return-low-volatility regimes of stock return, and the recession regimes of
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GDP serving as the low-return-high-volatility regimes of stock return. Although this assumption
can well capture the observation that economic downturns usually come with stock market
downturns, it may understate the overall volatility of stock returns in the simulated data
because historical data suggest that the low-return-high-volatility regime of stock returns
occurs more frequently than economic recession. Key simulation parameters for stock returns
include: regime specific mean stock returns and regime specific standard deviations.
Parameters for backward-looking simulations are calculated based on the NBER recession and
expansion periods. For forward-looking simulations, we calibrated the downward the
parameters for regime-specific expected real total stock returns such that the 30-year
geometric mean stock return is approximately equal to 6.7 percent, which is consistent with the
forward-looking stock return assumption used in Mennis, et al. (2017).
Total bond returns. Total bond returns are simulated as a separate random walk process with
drift that is correlated with stock returns. The innovation terms of bond returns and stock
returns are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution. The covariance between the innovation
term of stock and innovation term of bond is calibrated so that the correlation between the
simulated annual stock returns and annual bond returns is consistent with historical
correlations. For backward-looking simulations, the mean return and standard deviations of a
portfolio of long-term corporate bonds estimated from 1953-2015 data are used as simulation
parameters. For forward-looking simulations, the parameters for expected bond return and
standard deviation are set such that, in the 2,000 simulations, the median 30-year geometric
mean bond return is approximately 3.6 percent and the median 30-year standard deviation is
approximately 4 percent, which is consistent with the forward-looking assumptions for core
bond returns used in Mennis, et al. (2017).
The target annual GDP growth is obtained from the 30-year projection of potential growth GDP
made by CBO (2017). The target assumptions on annual stock and bond returns are generally
consistent with the capital market assumptions used in Mennis, et. al (2017). The forwardlooking simulation parameters are provided in Table 17, the unadjusted historical-data based
parameters that are different from the forward-looking parameters are provided in the
footnote of the table.
In this report, we do model and simulate inflation explicitly. Instead, we assume a constant
inflation rate of 2 percent based on CBO’s long-term projection for 2017-2047.48 The assumed
inflation will be used to convert simulated nominal asset returns to real returns and to
construct the salary growth assumption and COLA in the pension finance simulation.
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Table 17 Model parameters used in the simulation

Analysis of simulation results
We produced simulations with both historical-data based parameters and forward-lookingassumptions based parameters. The latter will be used in the section Using the linked model to
analyze risks and fiscal stresses to evaluate the potential pension-related risks the sponsoring
governments may face in the future. In this section, we examine the simulation results
generated from the historical-data based parameters and see to what extent the simulation
model can produce data that are consistent with the historical pattern.
Because historical-data based parameters are estimated a sample period of 63 years (1953 to
2015), the simulation horizon in each of the 2,000 simulations are also set to 63 years (252
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quarters). Summary statistics, such as mean, standard deviation, and skewness, of the
simulated variables are calculated for each of the 2,000 simulations. To examine the plausibility
of the simulation results, we use a method that has a similar logic to statistical tests: we
compare the simulated distributions of the summary statistics and the statistics calculated
based on historical data, and ask the question that if our simulation model was the true datagenerating process in history, then how likely the actual historical data we observed today
would be generated? We will also do graphical comparison of the distributions of historical and
simulated variables.
Simulated GDP growth rates and regimes
Table 18 compares the statistics of historical GDP growth rates with the distributions
(characterized by median, 5th, 25th, 75th and 95th percentiles) of these statistics across the
2,000 simulations. The table also shows the percentiles of the historical statistics in the
simulated distribution (the rightmost column).
The pattern of the simulated economic regimes is generally consistent with the historical data.
The historical frequency of recession and average length of expansion are quite to the median
values in the simulated distributions; the historical average length of recession fall on the
higher end of the simulated distribution (79th percentile) but still cannot be considered as
extreme values.
The historical mean growth rate (3.0 percent) is very close to the median of the simulated mean
growth (3.1 percent). Figure 15 compares the Q-Q plots of the historical and simulated annual
GDP growth. Simulated GDP growth rates have similar fat lower tail as the historical data, but
have a thinner upper tail, which indicates that the simulation model generates less very high
GDP growth rates than the historical data would suggest, and can largely explain why the
historical standard deviation and skewness of GDP growth fall on the high end of the simulated
distribution (91th percentile and 88th percentile). The discrepancy in the upper tail between
the simulated and historical distribution of GDP growth is not expected to have a significant
impact on the pension-related risk we want to examine, which is mainly associated with weak
fiscal conditions that are caused by slow or negative economic growth at the lower tail of the
distribution.
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Table 18 Simulated distribution of GDP growth and durations of recessions and expansoins are generally
consistent with historical data

Figure 15 Simulated GDP growth rates have similar fat left tail as the historical data but thinner right tail

Historical and simulated distribution of stock returns
Table 19 compares the statistics of historical stock returns with the distributions (characterized by median, 5th, 25th, 75th and
95th percentiles) of these statistics across the 2,000 simulations. The table also shows the percentiles of the historical statistics
in the simulated distribution (the rightmost column). The historical mean stock return and kurtosis are close to the median
values in the simulated distributions (40th percentile and 52th percentile); the historical standard deviation and skewness of
stock returns fall on the lower end of the simulated distributions (19th percentile and 11th percentile) but cannot be considered
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as extreme values. Figure 16 compares the Q-Q plots of the historical and simulated annual stock returns. Simulated
distribution of annual return has fat left tails for values less than -25%. Table 19 Comparing historical and simulated stock

returns

Figure 16 Simulated distribution of annual stock returns have fatter tails than historical distribution

Historical and simulated distribution of bond returns
Table 20 compares the statistics of historical long-term bond returns with the distributions
(characterized by median, 5th, 25th, 75th and 95th percentiles) of these statistics across the
2,000 simulations. Figure 17 compares the Q-Q plots of the historical and simulated annual stock
returns.
Since bond returns are simulated using a simple normal distribution, it does not capture the
occasional extreme positive bond returns (4 out of 61 data points) in history. Excluding the
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extreme values, the distribution of the historical bond returns is quite consistent with normal
distribution.
Table 20 Comparing historical and simulated bond returns

Figure 17 The bond returns simulated by normal distribution does not capture the extreme postive bond returns
in history

Summary of simulation results and implications
The simulated distribution of GDP growth is generally consistent with historical data except that
the simulated distribution shows a thinner tail in the upper end (less likely to have very high
growth rates than the historical data shows). The regime-switching simulation approach is
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capable of capturing the dependences between low-return-high-volatility periods of stock
returns and severe economic downturns.
The simulation approach with synchronized regimes of stock returns and GDP growth, which
will be further linked to tax revenues and pension contributions, will allow us to examine the
risk of sharp rises in pension contributions when the sponsoring governments are under fiscal
pressure due to economic downturns. The simulated stock-return distributions with fatter tails
than normal distributions will allow us to evaluate the impact of more frequent large negative
returns on pension funding and the fiscal pressure on sponsoring governments.

Using the macroeconomic model to drive revenue resources of stylized governments
Goals and overall approach
While investment returns can be related to the economy, governmental tax revenue also is
related to the economy (and can be related directly to returns on assets as well). In recent
recessions, investment returns have been driven down sharply and tax revenue has declined or
weakened as well. Thus, pension contributions may increase when or shortly after tax revenue
weakens, making it all the harder for governments to pay higher contributions.
In this project, we use the economic growth and investment-return outputs of the
macroeconomic model to forecast tax revenue of stylized governments, which allows us to
explore the extent to which risks to pension plans and governments may change when we take
the endogeneity of tax revenue into account.
Our overall goal is to capture how resources available to governments to pay contributions may
change over relevant portions of the business cycle. In addition, because different governments
rely on different taxes, and different taxes respond differently to the business cycle, we want to
construct our measure of resources from a portfolio of individual taxes that may change from
one kind of government to another.
As we describe below, we plan to construct revenue forecasts for governments as follows:
1. We will construct a portfolio of taxes for two stylized governments, consisting of a mix
of income, sales, property, and other taxes. One stylized government is an income-taxdominant government that relies heavily on the income tax for 50-60 percent of its
revenue and uses a mix of other taxes for the remainder, similar in some ways to New
York or California. Another stylized government is an sales-tax-dominant government
that does not have personal income tax and relies heavily on sales taxes.
2. Total annual growth rate of each individual tax consists of a long-run trend component,
which remains constant relative to the economic growth, and the cycle component
around the trend that reflects how growth of tax revenue tends to respond to economic
changes. For example, income taxes will be highly cyclical, and will increase more or fall
even more sharply when asset values rise or fall significantly. By contrast, the “other”
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category will be far more stable. Because asset values play a role, particularly for the
income tax, revenue cycles will vary depending upon letter asset values change sharply
during a recession or recovery.
3. Thus, governmental resources will reflect the business cycle and his character, and the
composition of the government’s tax structure.
Summary measure of governmental resources to consider – own-source revenue, or taxes?
Over the long run state governments can adjust their revenue structures to raise revenue to
pay for services that taxpayers are willing to support, and they can allow local governments to
do the same. Thus, over the long run, the economy’s capacity to generate revenue is the major
constraint on resources. In the short run, political systems do not adapt so easily. Some
governments have constitutional constraints on revenue sources they may use, and
constitutions do not change quickly. Some local governments have constraints on revenue they
can raise, imposed by higher levels of government. Thus, in the short run, we are especially
interested in the revenue that may be raised from existing tax structures.
But which measure of revenue? We are interested in revenue that governments can raise from
their own resources, rather than counting on revenue from higher levels of government. The
broadest such measure typically is called “own-source revenue,” which includes taxes, fees, and
other miscellaneous revenue that a government can impose. Another commonly used summary
measure of revenue is just total tax revenue, not including fees and other miscellaneous
revenue.
In concept, own-source revenue seems like the preferred measure. However, data limitations
often mean that it includes revenue we might not consider available to politicians to increase to
help pay for pension contributions. For example, it often includes tuition revenue, for which
there is an associated service, and it may also include patient fees for medical services.
Because of these complications, in this draft we focus on tax revenue, although we
acknowledge that own-source revenue is preferable conceptually.49
Specific taxes to examine and their trends and cycles
Based on our analysis of Census Bureau data on the composition of governmental taxes, we
think it makes sense to divide taxes into the following categories:50
•
•
•
•

Personal income taxes
Sales taxes
Real property taxes
Other taxes (the remainder – including corporate income taxes, estate taxes, and other
miscellaneous taxes)

We use this breakdown because it allows us to capture the great variation in tax portfolios that
governments have, and the great variation in how different taxes respond to changes in the
economy.
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Different taxes respond differently to changes in the economy. As we noted above, income
taxes and excise taxes did have very different long-run behavior. They and other taxes also have
very different cyclical behavior. It is hard to observe this behavior precisely because we have
very little “pure” data on tax revenue: most of our observed data reflect actual tax collections,
which reflect the frequent changes that policymakers make to tax bases and rates. Thus, yearto-year changes reflect economic trends, legislative changes, and a variety of other factors. 51
Trends
The first question is what revenue responses to changes in the economy do we want to capture
in our long-term simulations? Some taxes tend to grow more quickly than the economy and
some taxes tend to grow more slowly. For example, many states have progressive income taxes
that impose higher marginal rates on higher levels of income. Income tax revenue will grow
more quickly than the underlying income grows, because average incomes tend to rise over
time due to productivity growth and inflation, and this pushes people into higher tax brackets.52
some other taxes, especially excise taxes imposed upon the quantity of goods sold, do not
capture growth in the prices of these commodities and therefore their revenue tends to fall
relative to the economy over time, except when politicians raise rates.
Politicians and taxpayers generally do not want tax revenue to grow on autopilot over the long
run, continually rising (or falling) relative to the economy. Thus, over the long run politicians
often cut income taxes and raise sin taxes, partially offsetting their underlying trends.
There have been episodes in the history of United States where governments have raised or
lowered the overall level of taxation substantially, such as when state and local government
taxes were increased to help pay the escalating education costs of baby boomers entering
school. However, these are political decisions reflecting taxpayer and political preferences, and
are not easy to predict.
For purposes of our analysis, we assume that taxes will stay constant relative to the economy
over the long run, but that there will be cycles around this trend.53 Our job is to construct
reasonable estimates of these cycles, for different taxes.
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Figure 18 Trends in major tax categories realtive to GDP
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Figure 19 Comparing trend growth rate of GDP with trend growth rates of major tax categories
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Cycles
Figure 20 Cycles in revenues of major taxes

Personal income tax: Perhaps the most notable conclusion is that in recent decades the
personal income tax has become far more cyclical than in the past, and far more cyclical than
other taxes.54 This heightened cyclicality has been driven in large part by changes in the nature
of recessions and recoveries: income from financial markets, especially from capital gains on
the sale of stock and other assets, have played a prominent role in income subject to tax and in
resulting tax revenue. Thus, the nature of an economic recession or recovery, and not just its
depth and duration, is important. A recession accompanied by sharp declines in asset values,
such as either of the last two recessions, has had a far more detrimental impact on income tax
revenue than have earlier recessions. We capture this in an approximate fashion in our analysis.
Sales taxes: Over the long run, the sales tax has been declining relative to the economy, for
several reasons.55 the cyclical behavior of these taxes is highly related to consumption of
commodities that are taxed. Sales taxes almost always tax durable goods, the consumption of
which tends to be quite cyclical (keeping people often postpone the purchase of a car during a
recession), and many other goods and services that can be curtailed when times get hard, such
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as restaurant meals. Most states exempt many necessities from the general sales tax, including
prescription drugs, and, in some states food for consumption at home. As a consequence, the
sales tax tends to be more cyclical than total consumption albeit less cyclical than personal
income taxes, but all of this can vary depending upon the specific tax base that a state uses. In
addition to general sales taxes, governments also collect excise taxes on specific commodities
such as cigarettes, alcohol, and motor fuel. Excise and selective sales taxes for many
governments make up a large share of this category. Taxes on addictive and habit-forming
products such as cigarettes and alcohol tend to be relatively stable even in recessions
compared to general sales taxes.
Property taxes: It is difficult to define and measure the cyclical behavior of property taxes for
several reasons. First, tax rates tend to be adjusted every year by policymakers in a way that is
not done with income and sales taxes. Second, changes in market values of property may take
years to be reflected in legally assessed values of property due to lags inherent in the
administrative and political aspects of tax assessment. Finally, idiosyncratic rules in individual
governments will affect the assessments of individual properties and the ability of governments
to raise or lower the aggregate levy. All this makes it very hard to observe over history how
property taxes might change (absent legislative action) in response to changes in the economy.
There have been some instances of significant changes in property taxes in cases where values
changed dramatically on a sustained basis, such as during the Texas oil bust of the 1980s, and
the real estate bust associated with the recent recession.56 However, most episodes in history
suggest that the property tax is very stable relative to the economy, except when policymakers
make explicit choices about raising or lowering the tax. This varies greatly across places,
depending upon tax limitations that are in place.
Other taxes: Governments use a broad array of other taxes that include corporate income
taxes, estate taxes, and miscellaneous other taxes. Corporate income taxes are extremely
volatile but rarely are important to governmental revenue. Many other taxes do not have clear
cyclical properties.
Summary of stylized behavior of individual taxes
The table below summarizes our conclusions about the long run and cyclical behavior of the
four major taxes we discussed, based upon our review of relevant research and our own
analysis of data. As noted, we focus in this project on constructing the cyclical behavior taxes,
and we assume that policymakers adjust rates and bases to keep the taxes a constant share of
the economy over the long run.
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Table 21 Long run and cyclical behavior of major taxes

Tax

Personal income tax

Sales tax

Property taxes

Long run behavior

Cyclical behavior
Much sharper swings than
the economy (GDP), primarily
because of sharp swings in
Grows faster than the
income from financial assets,
economy due to progressivity
and how that income is
taxed. Increased cyclicality,
last few decades.
Changes in general sales
taxes are somewhat sharper
than the economy, primarily
because sales taxes exempt
Grows more slowly than the
many necessities and tax
economy due to changes in
many goods and services that
consumption and how
are easily postpone able
different components are
(cars, restaurant meals, etc.)
taxed, and due to difficulty of
collecting taxes on eExcise and selective sales
commerce. See e.g., Mikesell taxes are generally not very
cyclical (e.g., cigarette taxes)
or moderately cyclical (motor
fuel taxes).
Almost impossible to observe
because in most places rates
are set administratively (rate
= desired levy / assessed
value of property). Some
places face severe limits on
the rate or growth in the levy
(e.g., California, Prop 13),
others do not. If rates were
held constant, then revenue
would have same cyclicality
as the base (real estate
values), allowing lags for
assessment response.
Property values these have
been relatively stable or
highly volatile depending on
the specific kind of recession.

Unclear.
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Tax

Other taxes

Long run behavior
Often exhibit longer term
decline relative to economy.
Many of these taxes are
quantity-based (e.g.,
cigarette tax cents per pack)
and do not keep up with
inflation-driven nominal GDP.
Many follow real
consumption of the
associated products, and that
consumption may be
declining.

Cyclical behavior

Corporate income taxes are
extremely volatile but rarely
are important to
governmental revenue. Many
other taxes do not have clear
cyclical properties.

Constructing the trend and cyclical behavior of tax revenues
Trends in specific taxes
Individual taxes can exhibit different long-run behavior relative to the economy – for example,
progressive income taxes generally will grow more quickly than the economy, while state sales
tax bases have been declining relative to the economy.57 In our analyses below, we assume that
politicians will adjust tax bases and rates to maintain their shares of the economy over the long
run, but that there will be cycles around this trend.58 We assume the trend growth rates of all
tax categories are equal to the trend growth rate of GDP, which is 1.9 percent (in real term).
Cycles in specific taxes
We estimate the cyclical relationships between taxes and the economy for state personal
income taxes, the state general sales tax, state selective sales taxes, and all other state
government taxes as a group. We focus on these taxes because they play prominent roles in
states’ tax portfolios.
To estimate relationships between the cyclical components of tax revenue and the economy,
we use annual national data for 1977-2015 on tax revenue for the major tax types, obtained
from the Urban Institute’s Data Query System (SLF-DQS).59 60 We adjust each series for inflation
using the GDP price index. We then remove the trend from each tax series, from real GDP, and
from stock market returns using a decomposition approach known as the Hodrick–Prescott
filter, which allows the trend to move slowly over time.61 We subtract the trend of each series
from its unadjusted value to obtain the cyclical component.62
Personal income tax revenue
In addition to GDP growth, realized capital gains is the ideal variable to include as an
independent variable in a model of personal income tax revenue. Realized capital gains are not
directly modeled in our macro-economic model. However, stock returns and realized capital
gains have tended to move in tandem, especially during the recent two crises, although stock
73

returns are less volatile than realized capital gains. Because of this relationship, we use stock
returns as a proxy for realized capital gains in the regression analysis.
Figure 21 Income tax revenue is influenced heavily by stock-market-driven capital gains

Table 22 shows the regression analysis results of the national aggregate of state personal income

tax (PIT), all growth rates below are referred to as the cyclical components of the annual real
growth rates.
When only GDP growth is included in the regression, the result shows that a 1 percent of GDP
growth percent is associated with a 1.42 percent growth in state PIT. We also run a regression
that also include an interaction term between GDP growth and a dummy variable for the time
period after 1997. [add an endnote for the choice of shifting point] The estimated parameter of
the interaction term is significant. The adjusted R-squared is 0.2863.
Including lagged realized capital gains greatly improve the goodness of fit of the model,
increasing the adjusted R-squared from around 0.3 to over 0.8. [See models (3), (4), (5)]
Parameters on lagged realized capital gains are highly significant in all three model
specifications. (upper panel of the Table 22). The results also show that the state PIT become
more responsive to realized capital gains after 1997: the estimated elasticity of total state PIT
with respect to capital gains increases from 0.06 before 1997 to over 0.15 after 1999. With the
realized capital gains included in the model, the elasticity of state GDP with respect to real
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economy growth decreases to below unity, and the interaction term in regression (4) for a shift
of the GDP elasticity after 1999 is not significant.
Next we look at the model results when stock returns are used as a proxy for realized capital
gains. [See models (3’), (4’), (5’)]. While the parameters on lagged stock return are significant
for the post-1997 period (0.19 in model (4’) and 0.23 in model (5’)), they are not for the pre1999 period. The estimated elasticities of state PIT with respect to GDP in these models are
close to 1 in model (3’) and (5’). The values of adjusted R-squared for model (4’) and (5’) are
around 0.6, which are about 0.3 lower than the values for their counterparts with realized
capital gains as regressors.
Results of model (3’) and (5’) will be used as the basis for constructing simulation parameters.
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Table 22 Regression results for individual income tax

Sales tax revenue
Table 23 shows the regression results of sales taxes. All growth rates below are referred to as
the cyclical components of the annual real growth rates.
With the GDP growth as the only independent variable, the estimated elasticity of real general
sales tax growth with real GDP growth is about 1.2. Note that this elasticity is lower than the
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estimated GDP elasticity of PIT when GDP growth is the only independent variable (1.42), but
higher than the estimated GDP elasticity of PIT when realized capital gains or stock returns is
included (about 1). The R-squared is about 0.62.
In regression (2) and (2’), dummy variables for the last two recessions are added to the
regression to capture the large response of sales tax to these recessions which may not be
consistent with other time periods. The estimated GDP elasticities are 0.9 for the sample period
1985-2015 (regression (2)) and 0.7 for the sample period 1995-2015 (regression (2’)), which are
much lower than the estimated elasticity in (1). (2) and (2’) show that there are 1.5-4 percent
annual drops during the last two recessions that cannot be explained by the long-run GDP
elasticity of general sales tax.
The estimated elasticity of select sales tax with respect to GDP is much lower that the elasticity
of general sales tax and not statistically significant. Moreover, only a very small portion of the
overall variation in the real growth of select sales tax can be explained by the real GDP growth
(R-squared is only about 10 percent).
(1) is the preferred model for constructing simulation parameters because the estimated
elasticity is more reasonable.

Figure 22 Cycles in sales taxes
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Table 23 Regression results for sales taxes

Other taxes (other than personal income and general sales taxes)
State non-personal-income-non-sales tax revenue includes corporate income tax, property tax
received by state, and various other taxes. These taxes account for about 15 percent of total
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state tax revenue in 2015. Table 24 shows the regression results of non-personal-income-nonsales tax revenue taxes.
If GDP growth is the only independent variable (model (1)), the estimated elasticity is about 1.3.
For model (2), the interaction term between real GDP growth and the dummy variable for post2000 period is significant. The result shows that the GDP elasticity of non-personal-income-nonsales taxes after 2000 is about three times as much as that before 2000. (0.6 before 2000 and
1.8 after 2000). This should be largely attributable to large decreases in corporate income tax
during the two recent recessions.
For model (3), the interaction term between real GDP growth and the dummy variable for the
recent two recessions is significant. For model (4), the dummy variables for the recent two
recessions are significant.
Since the share of non-personal-income-non-sales in total state tax revenue is low, we choose
to use the simplest model specification (model (1)) as the basis for the simulation parameters.
Figure 23 Cycles in other taxes
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Table 24 Regression results for other taxes

Model parameters for simulation
In our simulation model, we obtain growth for a revenue source by adding its trend growth to
its cyclical growth, where the cyclical component will depend upon GDP growth from our
economic scenario generator and, in the case of the income tax, upon stock market returns. As
noted earlier, we assume – lacking any basis for a better assumption - that politicians will adjust
tax revenue periodically to keep revenue as a constant share of the economy, meaning that
trend revenue will grow at the same rate as trend GDP. We adopt the Congressional Budget
Office’s assumption that trend growth in GDP over the next 30 years is likely to approximate 1.9
percent annually, reflecting anticipated labor force growth, labor force participation, and
productivity. Thus, we assume trend tax growth is 1.9 percent for each tax source.
Table 25 shows the trend growth rate for each tax and our assumptions, based upon

econometric estimates, of cyclical revenue elasticities. The first row shows the trend growth
rate. The second row shows the cyclical elasticity for the revenue source, relative to GDP
growth. For example, the sales tax cyclical elasticity is 1.2. Thus, if GDP has a cyclical decline
(relative to its trend) of 3 percent, the sales tax will have a cyclical decline of 3.6 percent
relative to its trend. The income tax is more complicated because it also reflects a cyclical
relationship to stock market returns.
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Table 25 Tax revenue elasticities

An example may help to explain how we apply these parameters in our simulation. Table 26
illustrates this for a hypothetical expansion year in a hypothetical simulation, in which real GDP
grows 1 percentage point above its trend growth and real stock returns are 2 percentage points
above their trend return.64
The first row shows how we calculate growth for the individual income tax, which is the mostcomplex case. The first two columns show that we estimate the elasticity of the cyclical
component of the real income tax to the cyclical component of real GDP is 1.0, and the
elasticity of the cyclical component of the real income tax to the cyclical component of real
stock returns is 0.2 (these results are drawn from Table 25.) The next two columns show the
cyclical real GDP growth and cyclical real stock return values for our hypothetical year, as
mentioned in the paragraph above.
The final column shows the calculation of the cyclical component of the income tax: (a) it is
boosted by 1 percentage point because real GDP is growing 1 percentage point above trend,
and the elasticity is 1.0; and it is boosted by another 0.4 percentage points because real stock
returns are 0.4 percentage points above trend and the elasticity relative to stock returns is 0.2.
Adding the two calculated results, cyclical real income tax growth is 1.4 percentage points.
Total real income tax growth is the sum of its trend revenue growth plus this cyclical
component.65
The remaining rows of the table illustrate the calculation for the other taxes. This calculation is
much simpler because these taxes generally are not correlated with stock returns and our
models for these taxes do not incorporate stock returns.
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Table 26 How we use model parameters to calculate tax revenue growth in the simulations

Constructing stylized governments with specific mixes of taxes
Composition of state tax revenue
After we model the cyclical behavior of individual taxes, we construct tax portfolios for two stylized

governments, consisting of a mix of income, sales, and other taxes. The income tax and the
general sales tax are the two largest state government taxes, on average, and that the property
tax dominates local government taxation. Before constructing stylized governments, it is useful
to look at the distribution of the two largest state taxes, as shown in Figure 24.
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Figure 24 Individual income tax and general sales tax shares of state tax revenue

States clustered in the upper left corner of Figure 24 rely heavily on the sales tax and have no
income tax, including the large states of Florida, Texas, and Washington. These sales-taxdominant states constitute an important group, especially given that the sales tax and the
income tax have different cyclical behaviors, as discussed earlier. Most of the other states rely
partly on the income tax and the sales tax. (Alaska and New Hampshire are the only two states
with no general sales tax and no broad-based income tax.66 Oregon is unique in relying
extremely heavily on the income tax, and having no general sales tax.) While there are not
other obvious groupings like the sales-tax dominant states, we think it makes sense to examine
states that rely heavily on the income tax, with some sales tax reliance as well, as several large
states fit this model, including California, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia.

83

Table 27 Taxt revenue structure of income-tax-dominant states and sales-tax-dominant states

Constructing stylized governments
After we model the cyclical behavior of individual taxes, we construct tax portfolios for two stylized

governments, consisting of a mix of income, sales, and other taxes. One stylized government is
income-tax-dominant, relying on the income tax for 55 percent of its tax revenue and using a
mix of other taxes for the remainder, similar to Oregon, Virginia, or New York. A second stylized
government is sales-tax dominant, relying on the general sales tax for 60 percent of its revenue,
with no income tax, similar to Texas, Washington, or Florida.
Table 28 summarizes the tax portfolios for our two stylized governments.
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Table 28 Tax structure of stylized state governments

The net effect of our approach is that governmental resources will reflect the business cycle
and its character, and the composition of the government’s tax structure.
In our analyses below, we measure the burden of pension contributions as a percentage of tax
revenue for these stylized governments. We also examine a “baseline” government in which tax
revenue grows at the same rate as trend GDP, without any further cycle.

Using the linked model to analyze risks and fiscal stresses
We can examine the potential compounding of risks with the simulated tax revenue of stylized
governments and simulated pension finances, with both simulations are linked to the
macroeconomic simulation. Economic growth and asset returns are jointly simulated by a
regime-switching process that capture the historical pattern of the business cycle. The tax
revenues of stylized governments are then calculated based on the simulated economic
conditions and asset returns. The asset returns are fed in to our pension simulation model to
calculate the required employer contributions, among other variables of interest.
Illustration of a single simulation
We first illustrate the simulation results using a single simulation (#2) selected from 2000
stochastic simulation runs.
Figure 25 presents simulated GDP growth and stock returns. The years marked by dashed vertical

lines have at least one quarter in recession67. In this particular simulation, economic downturns
are mostly associated with sharp declines in stock returns (the model may generate recessions
without large drops in stock returns in other simulations).
Figure 26 shows how tax revenues of the two types of stylized governments respond to the

simulated economic conditions. The tax revenue of the income-tax-dominant state is generally
more volatile than tax revenue of the sales-tax-dominant state and has larger declines during
recession periods, which are consistent with the historical pattern.
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Figure 25 Illustrating simulated economic conditions using a single run of simulation

Figure 26 Illustrating the simulated tax revenue growth of the two stylized governments using a single run of
simulation

Distribution of real tax growth
Tax revenue of the income-tax-dominant state is more volatile than tax revenue of the salestax-dominant state primarily because its revenue responds not only to GDP growth but also to
capital gains driven in large part by stock market returns.
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Figure 27 shows the greater volatility of revenues in the income-tax-dominant state by displaying

“violin graphs” of the distributions of total tax revenue growth of the two stylized governments
across all 2,000 simulations and all years.
The box inside each figure describes the middle 50 percent of outcomes; the horizontal line in
middle of the box marks the median, the line at the top of the box marks the 75 th percentile,
and the line at the bottom marks the 25th percentile. The median tax revenue growth in the
income-tax-dominant state is about 2.4 percent, growth at the 75 th percentile is just over 4
percent, and growth at the 25th percentile is below 1 percent. The box for the income-taxdominant state is larger than the box for the sales-tax-dominant state, indicating that the
income-tax-dominant state had a greater range of growth rates than the sales tax state; that is,
income tax revenue is more volatile than sales tax revenue. The lines, or “whiskers” of the
graph extend up and down from the box, indicating the 90th and 10th percentiles.
The bulges on each graph show the distribution of outcomes, much like a bell curve turned
sideways.
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Figure 27 Simulated tax revenue is more volatile in the income-tax-dominant state than the sales-tax-dominant
state

Next, we examine the likelihood of large declines in tax revenue for the two stylized
governments in the 30-year simulation period. Figure 28 shows the probabilities of the stylized
government having experienced a 3 percent or 5 percent drop of tax revenue in a single year up
to a given simulation year. As expected, the income tax dominant state is much more likely to
experience large decline in tax revenue compared to the sales tax dominant state.
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Figure 28 The income tax dominant state is much more likely to experience large decline in tax revenue
compared to the sales tax dominant state

Simulating the finances of public pension plans
Separately, we have developed a simulation model that can be used to evaluate the
implications of public pension plan investment risk.68 The model calculates the actuarial
liabilities, annual cash flows, funded status, and covered payroll of a public pension plan for
future years based on the benefit rules, actuarial and economic assumptions, and demographic
structure of the plan. Each year the model starts with beginning asset values and computes
ending assets by subtracting benefits paid, adding employee and employer contributions
(including any amortization), and adding investment income, which we calculate in the model.
The model keeps track of these values and other variables of interest, such as the funded ratio
and employer contributions as a percentage of payroll. It saves all results so that they can be
analyzed after a simulation run in any way desired.
The model can be used to examine prototypical pension funds or can be used with data for
actual pension funds. In the analysis that follows, we use a prototypical fund that resembles
real-world pension plans in important ways. The key elements of the prototypical plan are
described below.
•

Plan characteristics. It has a typical age distribution of workers and retirees, and
benefits generally are calculated as 2.2 percentage points per year of service multiplied
by the average of the final three years of salary, plus a 2 percent annual cost-of-living
adjustment (COLA).69 The age structure of the plan population is based on our analysis
of data in the Public Plans Database, and is similar to the population of the Arizona State
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•
•

•

Retirement System70, , which we found to be fairly typical in many ways. We assume
that the plan has new hires each year sufficient to keep the number of active workers
stable. The plan sponsor makes contributions each year. The plan starts off 75 percent
funded with the actuarially liability calculated using a 7.5 percent discount rate.
Discount rate (assumed rate of return). 7.5 percent, a common assumption among
public pension plans.
Funding policies. Most pension funds adopt funding policies that can dampen the
volatility in contribution caused by unexpected investment losses and gains and other
deviation from their actuarial assumptions. The choice of funding policy also determines
how fast the plan pays down its Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability (UAAL). We
examine three funding policies with differing smoothing effects on contributions.
1) 10-year open constant dollar: Unfunded liabilities are paid down rapidly, with
constant-dollar amortization payments calculated over a 10-year open period.
The employer’s contribution in year 1 is 8.67 percent of total tax revenue.
2) 15-year open constant dollar: Unfunded liabilities are paid down less rapidly,
over a 15-year open period. The employer’s contribution in year 1 is 7.25 percent
of tax revenue.
3) 30-year open constant percent of payroll: Unfunded liabilities are paid down
very slowly, as a constant percentage of payroll of plan participants over a 30year open period. (Several large plans with large unfunded liabilities use this
method.) The employer’s contribution in year 1 is 5 percent of tax revenue.
Investment returns. We examine two sets of stochastic investment returns:
1) Returns generated by the regime-switching simulation model. As described
earlier, the regime-switching model generates 2,000 simulations each with a 30year series of equity returns and bond returns, linked to GDP growth. We
construct a portfolio consisting of 70 percent of equities and 30 percent bonds.
2) Returns drawn from normal distribution. The expected annual return and
standard deviation are equal to those of the simulation-based 70/30 portfolio.
2,000 random returns are drawn from the normal distribution for each year in
the simulation.

Given a funding policy and a set of investment returns, we run 2,000 simulations and compute
the required employer contributions, the funded ratio, and other variables of interest of the
prototypical pension plan. Then we can gain insight into the fiscal stress that the pension plan
creates for the stylized governments by comparing the simulated employer contributions
against the simulated tax revenues.

90

Evaluating the potential compounding of risks from correlated investment returns and tax
revenues.
By this point, we have tax revenues, asset returns, and pension finances that are all generated
within a coherent simulation framework. Changes in tax revenues and investment returns,
which in turn affect required pension contributions, are both driven by business cycles that are
simulated by the regime-switching process of GDP growth between recessions and expansion
periods.
With these simulation outputs of the linked models, we can examine the compounding of risks
from correlated investment returns and tax revenues. We evaluate the pension-related risks for
the two stylized governments - income-tax-dominant state and sales-tax-dominant state, and
compare that with the risks under a baseline model that has no linkage between tax revenue
and asset returns. This comparison will demonstrate how the pension-related risks would be
understated if the linkage is ignored.
We constructed alternative model structures to investigate how much of the increase in risk
can be attributed to each of the following: (1) linking tax revenue to the economy, (2) linking
asset returns to the economy, (3) the combined effects of linking tax revenue and asset returns
to the economy, and (4) tax structures of the stylized governments, and the fact that income
tax revenue is linked directly to GDP growth as well as to stock returns, potentially creating
additional risk for the income-tax-dominant state.
The table below summarizes the six model structures we compare.
Table 29 Simulation models for comparison

Model

Tax revenue Asset return
Based on
Tax revenue
linked to
linked to
stylized
linked to
GDP?
GDP?
government? asset return?

Description

(1)

Unlinked model:
- Constant growth of total tax revenue (equal to trend GDP growth).
- Returns from normal distribution.

No

No

No

No

(2)

Asset return linked only:
- Constant growth of total tax revenue (equal to trend + cycle GDP growth).
- Returns from regime-switching simulation model.

No

Yes

No

No

(3)

Tax revenue linked only:
- Cyclical growth of total tax revenue (equal to trend plus cycle GDP growth).
- Returns from normal distribution.

Yes

No

No

No

(4)

Both tax revenue and asset return linked:
- Cyclical growth of total tax revenue (equal to trend plus cycle GDP growth).
- Returns from regime-switching simulation model.

Yes

Yes

No

No

(5)

Stylized government: sales-tax-dominant state
- Cyclical growth of total tax revenue; estimated responsiveness to GDP growth.
- Returns from regime-switching simulation model.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

(6)

Stylized government: income-tax-dominant state
- Cyclical growth of total tax revenue; estimated responsiveness to GDP growth
and asset return.
- Returns from regime-switching simulation model.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Model (1) serves as the baseline case in which neither tax revenue nor asset return are linked
to the regime-switching process of GDP. It assumes that the total real tax revenue of the
government grows at a constant rate which is equal to the trend growth rate of GDP (1.9
percent) and investment returns are normally distributed.
Model (2) only links asset returns to GDP cycles and Model (3) only links tax revenue, so the
simulation results of these two models reflect the isolated effects of linking only one variable to
the business cycle.
Model (4) links both tax revenue and asset returns to GDP cycles and reflects the compounding
effects of correlated tax revenue and asset returns. In Models (3) and (4), the growth rate of
total tax revenue equals the total GDP growth rate (trend plus cycle).
Models (5) and (6) also link both tax revenue and asset returns to business cycles, but they
differ from Model (4) in that they incorporate our analysis of how tax revenues respond to
business cycles for the two stylized governments – the sales-tax-dominant state in Model (5),
and the income-tax-dominant state in Model (6). A distinguishing feature of Model (6) is that
the dominant tax category – personal income tax – is linked not only to GDP growth, but also to
stock market returns.
Measures of potential fiscal pressure
Under each of the six model structures, actuarially determined pension contributions are
generated by our pension simulation model under three alternative funding policies (see
section Simulating the finances of public pension plans). We treat actuarially determined
contributions as required employer contributions, although governments do not always pay
them. Employer contributions as a percentage of the total tax revenue in the first simulation
year are determined as follows:
•

•
•

We calibrate total tax revenue in year 1 so that the required employer contribution
under the “30-year open constant percent of payroll” policy is 5 percent of total tax
revenue in year 1.
The total tax revenue calculated based on this assumption is then used for the other
two policies, so that tax revenue is the same across contribution policies.
Thus, the employer contribution as a percentage of total tax revenue in year 1 is 5
percent under the “30-year open constant percent of payroll” policy, 7.3 percent under
the “15-year open constant dollar” policy, and 8.7 percent under the “10-year open
constant dollar” policy.

We examine two types of risks that the sponsoring governments of public pension plans may
face:
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1. The risk that required employer contributions become very high relative to fiscal
resources available to the sponsoring government, creating great fiscal pressure and
potentially crowding out other public services. In our analysis of the simulation results,
we measure this type of risk by the probability that employer contributions as a
percentage of total tax revenue will become more than 5 percentage points higher than
the level in year 1 at any time during the 30-year simulation period.
2. The risk that required employer contributions rise sharply in a short period of time,
creating difficulty in budget planning and short-term fiscal pressure. We measure this
type of risk by the probability that employer contributions rise more than 3 percent of
total tax revenue in a 2-year period at any time during the 30-year simulation period.
Our 3-percent- and 5-percent-of-tax-revenue thresholds for our two risk measures are
arbitrary, but we think they are broadly indicative of tax-revenue changes that cause fiscal
stress. They are based in part upon our experience analyzing and participating in state budget
decision making over several decades. One way to think about this is to examine tax revenue
shortfalls in recessions. In the first two years of the 1990, 2001, and 2007 recessions, tax
revenue in the median state fell short by about 3.6 percent, 13 percent, and 14 percent,
respectively.71 From this perspective, our two-year risk measure involves less fiscal pressure
than tax shortfalls in recent recessions, but given that pension contributions typically only are
three to seven percent of state tax revenue, the risk measure will only be triggered if
contributions increase very significantly. Our longer-term risk measure is larger than our shortterm indicator, but will only be triggered if there is a sizable shift in the use of tax revenue over
a long period of time.
Another way of thinking about the risk measures is to conduct sensitivity analysis, using
different (but still arbitrary) thresholds, to see whether alterative measures lead to different
conclusions about the impact of considering linkages between the economy, investment
returns, and tax revenue. We discuss the results of sensitivity analysis in a not in the section
that describes our results.
The risk of high employer contributions
Table 30 shows the risk of employer contributions rising by 5 percentage points or more
relative to the starting point under our different models and funding policies. The three rows of
the table show our three funding policies and the six columns show the size of the risk under
our six models.
The first column presents the risk measure when tax revenue grows smoothly over time
without any business cycle effects, and investment returns are normally distributed and
independent over time, without any correlation to the economy. For example, there is a 6.8
percent chance that employer contributions will rise by more than 5 percentage points of tax
revenue above their year 1 levels at some point during the 30-year simulation period – a
smaller risk than in any column to the right.
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The second column also assumes that tax revenue grows smoothly, but now investment returns
are generated by the regime-switching simulation model that results in a heavier left tail in the
return distribution than in the normal distribution, and returns are correlated with economic
conditions rather than being independent over time. Thus, comparing this column to column 1
shows us the pure effect of linking investment returns to the economy, without considering tax
revenue cyclicality, shedding light on the impact of introducing non-normality in investment
returns. The risks of high employer contributions are only slightly higher than in the base case.
Column 3 now allows tax revenue to be exactly as cyclical as real GDP is. For example, if real
GDP grows 2 percentage points more quickly than its trend, tax revenue will grow at the same
rate. Investment returns are drawn from the normal distribution rather than being generated
by our ESG. Thus, comparing column 3 to column 1 shows us the pure effect of introducing
volatility in tax revenue that is not correlated with investment returns, without accounting for
differences in tax structure. The risks are slightly greater than in the base case and not much
different from those in column 2.
Column 4 allows tax revenue to be exactly as cyclical as real GDP and has investment returns
generated by the model.
•
•

•

Comparing this column to column 3 shows the risk introduced by having investment
returns linked to the economy in addition to cyclical tax revenue.
Comparing this column to column 2 shows the risk introduced by having cyclical
revenue. In either comparison, the increase in risk is quite large. For example, under a
10-year open constant-dollar funding policy, the risk of a contribution increase that is at
least 5 percentage points of tax revenue is 17.8 percent, or more than a one in six
chance of such an increase during the 30-year simulation period.
Comparing column 4 to column 1 demonstrates that while the isolated effects of linking
tax revenue or investment returns to the business cycle are modest, the compounding
effect of correlated tax revenue and investment returns is quite large. For example,
under the 15-year open constant dollar funding policy, the risk of high pension
contribution is 2.7 times as great much as in column 1 (17.2 percent compared to 6.4
percent), while for columns 2 and 3 the measures are only 1.4 and 1.5 times as great.

Columns 5 and 6 introduce our two stylized governments, with tax revenue cycles depending
not just on real GDP cycles but also on tax structure. In both models, returns are generated by
the economic scenario generator. The risks for the sales-tax-dominant government actually are
slightly smaller than if revenue is exactly as cyclical as real GDP.72 The risks for the income-taxdominant state are much larger: the risk of a large employer contribution is 22.8 percent,
compared to 16.5 percent for the sales-tax-dominant state, and compared to 6.8 percent for
the base case where neither investment returns nor tax revenue are linked to the economy –
the kinds of simulations that we have reported on in past papers.
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Table 30 Risk of high pension contribution relative to tax revenue

Comparing risks as we move down the rows of Table 30 also is instructive, as it shows the
interplay between funding policy and contribution risk. Risks of large employer contributions
fall somewhat as the funding policy lengthens, particularly as we move from 15 years to 30
years and change from constant dollar funding to level-percentage-of-pay funding. Because this
risk measure compares every year in a 30-year simulation to the starting year, it is a measure of
longer-term risks, and funding policies that smooth contributions have only limited ability to
reduce this risk. They have much greater ability to reduce the risk of large employer
contributions in a short period of time, as discussed below.
The risk of large contribution increases in a short period of time
Table 31 presents our short-term risk measure – the probability that employer contributions will
rise by more than three percent of tax revenue in any two-year period during our 30-year
simulation - for the same models and funding policies. The format and interpretation are the
same as for Table 30.
As with our other risk measure, the risk increases as we move to the right in the table, but not
as much as with our longer-term risk measure, the risk of a large contribution increase over the
30-year period. Furthermore, risks of sharp increases in employer contribution diminish
dramatically as we move down the rows of the table, lengthening the contribution smoothing
period and liberalizing the policy, by using constant-percentage of pay funding. Long smoothing
periods and more-liberal funding policies reduce short-term employer contribution risks
substantially.
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Table 31 Risk of sharp increases in pension contributions retaltive to tax revenue

Contribution smoothing policies can reduce employer risks, but they do not make risks go away:
they transfer them to the pension fund and its stakeholders, as we discuss in the next section.
Contribution-smoothing policies cannot make risks go away: They transfer risks from
governments to pension plans
Lower risks for sponsoring governments under funding policies with stronger contributionsmoothing effects come at the expense of higher risk that the pension plan will become
severely underfunded, as Table 32 demonstrates.
The first column of Table 32 ties to the fourth column of Table 30 to provide a useful point of
reference, showing how the risk of sharp increases in employer contributions declines as the
funding period lengthens and the policy liberalizes. The last column shows the risk that the
plan’s funded ratio will fall below 40 percent, which we consider to be crisis territory, at some
point during the 30-year simulation period. (We will explain the intervening columns in a
minute.) As we move down the rows, the risk of this crisis-level funding rises from 7.1 percent
with 10-year constant-dollar funding policy to 30.9 percent, or nearly a one in three chance,
with 30-year constant percent of payroll funding. (This latter risk is far greater than risks we
estimated in earlier papers, when investment returns were not linked to economic conditions.)
The risk protection that governments gain from stretched-out funding policies results in greater
risk to pension plans.
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Table 32 Greater contribution smoothing leads to higher risk of pension underfunding

Summary of simulation results
The simulation results demonstrate that it is important to allow for the correlation between tax
revenue, economic conditions, and investment returns when examining the investment-related
risks to public pension funds and the sponsoring governments. Contribution increases required
after economic downturns are much larger, relative to tax revenue, when we allow tax revenue
to be cyclical (varying with the economy) than when it is under simpler assumptions of stable
tax revenue growth.
The pension-related risks for governments are also affected by the responsiveness of the
governments’ fiscal resources to economic conditions. Income-tax-dominant states, the tax
revenues for which is more cyclical, would bear higher pension-related risks compared with
sales-tax-dominant states, which have less cyclical tax revenues.
The choice of funding policies for public pension funds also has a significant impact on the risks
the sponsoring governments face. Funding policies that pay down unfunded liabilities slowly
and have strong smoothing effects on contribution requirements can protect the sponsoring
governments from the risks of high or sharp increase in pension contributions, at the expense
of greatly increasing the risk of severe underfunding for the pension funds.

Conclusion
In this paper we examine how our assessment of risks to pension funds and their sponsoring
governments changes when we take into consideration the correlation between economic
conditions, investment returns, and governmental tax revenue. We do this by linking an
economic scenario generator - a small stochastic macroeconomic model that simulates real
GDP growth and investment returns – to models of tax revenue cyclicality and a pension
finance simulation model. Our paper builds upon other recent research that has examined risks
to pension funds and governments under alternative economic scenarios.
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The simulation results demonstrate that it is important to allow for correlation among
economic conditions, investment returns, and tax revenue when examining the investmentrelated risks to public pension funds and the sponsoring governments. Contribution increases
required after economic downturns are much larger, relative to tax revenue, when we allow tax
revenue to be cyclical (varying with the economy) than under simpler assumptions of stable tax
revenue growth.
Pension-related risks for governments can be further exacerbated by how state tax revenue
structures respond to economic conditions. All else equal, income-tax-dominant states, with
highly cyclical tax revenue, face higher pension-related risks than sales-tax-dominant states,
which have less cyclical tax revenues.
The choice of funding policies for public pension funds also has a significant impact on the risks
that sponsoring governments face. Funding policies that pay down unfunded liabilities slowly
and have strong smoothing effects on contribution requirements can protect the sponsoring
governments from the risks of high or sharp increase in pension contributions, at the expense
of greatly increasing the risk of severe underfunding for the pension funds.
This paper shows how important it is to incorporate budgetary resources in pension fund risk
analysis, and how that analysis can be deepened by modeling business cycles and investment
returns together. Our work in this area is preliminary and can be extended and improved upon.

98

Endnotes

1

One reason the sales-tax-dominant state may have lower risk than the case where revenue grows at the same
rate as GDP is that in simulations with many recessions, its general sales tax share of total tax revenue actually falls
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